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KASHMIR
AND THE CONSPIRACY
AGAINST PEACE

Rajbans Krishen

PEOPLE'S PUBLISHING HOUSE LTD, BOMBAY

PASCHAL

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B o m b a y

PEOPLE'S PUBLISHING HOUSE LTD

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Publishers' Note

IT is more than three years now that the Kashmir question was taken to the United Nations. During this long period, heated debates took place in the UNO, charges and counter-charges were made by both sides, a UN Commission visited Kashmir, a UN Representative arrived on the scene, ostensibly to help in bringing about agreement between India and Pakistan—but the only result of these much-publicised efforts has been to make the Kashmir problem far more difficult of solution than before the United Nations took it in hand; and today it has reached a point where a continuation of the armed deadlock leads directly to the ever-growing threat of war.

Why is it so? What are the reasons for the growing complexities of the Kashmir problem? Why have India and Pakistan failed to reach an agreement between themselves? What is the reality behind the UN intervention in Kashmir?

This book seeks to answer these burning questions. It presents to the democratic world opinion, in particular to the people of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, a picture of the sinister plot which the Anglo-American imperialists have hatched against Kashmir's freedom, and the unscrupulousness with which they have used the Kashmir dispute to widen and harden the differences between India and Pakistan.

The book seeks, further, to rouse the people of India and Pakistan to the consciousness that unless they join hands with Kashmir's national movement in launching a joint offensive against imperialist intrigues, that unless they themselves arrive at a peaceful settlement which guarantees

the fullest freedom and integrity of Kashmir's democratic movement, their own freedom from imperialist domination cannot be won.

The author is a young active worker of Kashmir's national movement, and has been closely connected with the freedom-battle ever since the "Quit Kashmir" struggle of 1946. It is because of his intimate knowledge of Kashmir and its people, and the devotion with which he has served their cause, that he writes with such sincerity and passion.

A peaceful and democratic solution of the Kashmir question vitally concerns not only the people of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, but is of great importance for the cause of world peace. And if this book helps the democratic world opinion, in particular the people of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, in arriving at a peaceful and democratic settlement, its publication will be amply justified.

I

The Background

THE Kashmir story begins with the publication, on May 12, 1946, of the Cabinet Mission Memorandum on the Indian States. Through the provisions of this Memorandum, through the theories advanced that with the so-called "transfer of power" the paramountcy of the British Crown had lapsed, and the 700 and odd Indian States had become sovereign and independent, free to enter or refuse to enter into relationship with the Indian Union, the British imperialists sought to maintain the States and their pro-British autocratic regimes as convenient bases from which they could continue to interfere in the internal affairs of the Indian people, one of the devices through which they could continue their whip-hand over India.

With the publication, on June 3, 1946, of the Mountbatten Plan for the partition of India, this theory of the lapse of paramountcy and the consequent assertion of the "independence" and "sovereignty" of the princely rulers assumed a more sinister meaning. The British Government insisted that the Indian States were free to enter into relations of any sort with either of the two Dominions, to join either of the Dominions in federal relation, irrespective of the territory in which they were situated, or to maintain treaty relations if the terms of federation were not tempting enough.

"We hope, as I have said," explained Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, "that the States will associate themselves with one or the other of the new Dominions in a federal or treaty relation on fair terms, fairly and amicably negotiated." (*Hansard*, July 14, 1946.)

"Until the constitutions of the Dominions have been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them." (*Ibid.*, July 10, 1946.)

"I do not doubt that a State, in negotiating terms on which it could accede to the Dominion, may make it a condition that the decision should be conditional on the Dominion concerned remaining within the Commonwealth." (*Ibid.*, July 14, 1946.)

The meaning of these statements by the Attorney-General was quite clear. On the one hand, the Congress leaders were being told by the British Government that the States would join their Dominion, the internal unity of their territories would be guaranteed only if they passed a constitution, worked within the framework of policies acceptable to the British and remained loyally within the Commonwealth.

On the other hand, provision was being made to keep the more important of the States directly under British control, as "independent" territories, to use them whenever necessary, either to incite the two Dominions against one another, or as bases of intervention against both.

Promptly the princely States fell, as if to order, into two more-or-less distinct categories. The majority were encouraged by the Political Department to enter into negotiations with the Congress leaders, to drive hard bargains, to press the Congress leadership to recognise the sovereignty of the princes, and to guarantee non-interference in their internal autocratic regimes. But the bigger ones, mainly Hyderabad and Kashmir, declared for independence.

Hyderabad, with its vast territories stretching right into the middle of the Indian Union, with its immense resources already in the grip of a pro-British aristocracy, and with a British-officered army, air bases and munition factories, was being nursed by the British Government as a secret strategic base against the Indian people. And the Nizam dutifully requested the Viceroy to recognise Hyderabad, with its "more than a century of faithful alliance", as a separate Dominion in the British Empire, having special treaty relations with Britain.

Kashmir, touching both India and Pakistan, and with its territories bordering on the Soviet Union, China and Tibet, was, if anything, of even greater strategic value to the British imperialists. Hence the deeply laid intrigues to retain Kashmir under their domination by hook or by crook. Hence also the desperate efforts to smash up the powerful national movement led by the National Conference, and the equally desperate attempts to bolster up the notoriously pro-British Premier, R.C. Kak.

But the savage repression let loose on the "Quit Kashmir" Movement in 1946 failed to destroy or disrupt the people's movement. Instead, it only succeeded in isolating the Maharaja's administration, in deepening the people's hatred and in solidifying their ranks. Having failed miser-

ably in their frontal attack on the people of the Valley, traditionally the base of Kashmir's national movement, the next obvious tactics for the British were to attack its weak and exposed flanks, and to disrupt the national movement in the Valley from within.

This they attempted in two simultaneous and closely connected moves. On the one hand, they selected Poonch as the weak link of the national movement, the area from which they could incite and spread the flames of communal hatred. Poonch had for many years past been united in a joint nationality front against the Kashmir *Durbar*. Though this opposition included both Hindus and Muslims, it was yet under the weak and feeble leadership of the Rani of Poonch and a few chieftains of local Muslim tribes. They had been careful not to bring the people into the orbit of their oppositional front. And Kashmir's National Conference leadership had failed to give the Poonch struggle a broad and popular mass character.

The British Commandant of the State Army, Brig. Scott, and the British Inspector-General of Police, Powell, undertook a widespread "reconnaissance" of Poonch, and the British stooge Premier, R. C. Kak, sent in armed gangs of Hindus and Sikhs to set upon its Muslim inhabitants, and plunder and massacre wherever they went.

The trick worked. Communal hatred spread with the rapidity of a forest fire. The incipient Poonchi struggle was successfully derailed and diverted. Against the background of mounting communal tension in the Punjab districts across the border, the ground was created for armed bands from the Muslim districts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi to rush to their brethren's rescue. On September 4, 1947, armed bands from *Tehsils* of Kahuta and Murree in the Western Punjab raided the State territories in Poonch.

On the other hand, with the announcement of the freedom given to the princely States to join whichever Dominion they pleased, an attempt was made to derail and disrupt the democratic movement in the Valley by posing before the people the unreal and artificially-inflated slogan of accession to either Dominion. As early as Oct. 1947, the Bombay monthly *Communist* had warned:

"It is imperialism's game to disrupt the great democratic movement led by the National Conference, by inciting communal passions over the issue of Pakistan *versus* Indian Union, and then to consolidate its grip over Kashmir to use it as its imperialist strategic base."

The strategy by which alone Kashmir's leaders could foil this imperialist game was also outlined by the *Communist* clearly and sharply:

“There is no doubt that the National Conference would defeat these disruptive efforts by placing in the forefront the issue of ending the present autocratic regime and establishing a fully democratic government in accordance with its programme.” (*Ibid.*)

It was recognised from the very beginning that if Kashmir's leaders failed to defeat this imperialist game by leading their people boldly and unfalteringly onwards in the struggle for full democracy in the new conditions thus created, if the national movement lost sight of the real goal before the people, the potentialities for evil of the unreal slogan of Hindustan *versus* Pakistan were truly incalculable. The leadership of the National Conference was known to be pro-Congress and anti-League. The people, though in the Valley they were united solidly behind the National Conference, were overwhelmingly Muslims by faith. With the terrifying holocaust of communal massacres sweeping across the Punjab, and with communal passions being worked up deliberately to a frenzy in Poonch, the people could fall an easy victim to the accession slogans. And wedged as Kashmir was between India and Pakistan, a tug-of-war between the two to gain control over it would be the easiest device to incite hostility between the two Dominions, and thus keep both under imperialist domination.

The leadership of the Muslim League began with an attempt to win over the reactionary Maharaja and his pro-British advisers to their side. The Congress is an enemy of the princes, they said. The League stands for non-interference in the internal autocratic regimes in the States, and for the recognition of the sovereign rights of the prince.

“The only sensible course for Kashmir is to join the Pakistan Dominion in which it can retain far greater freedom than it can as an integral part of the other Dominion.” (*Dawn*, July 30, 1947.)

At the same time it was rumoured that Governor-General Mountbatten was attempting to persuade both India and Pakistan to accept a barter in which Hyderabad would be allowed to join India provided Kashmir was given to Pakistan.

But in all their plans to decide Kashmir's future without reference to the people's will, the British were reckoning without their host. Immediately on his release from prison,

Sheikh Abdullah came forward to rally his people again, and put forward the democratic slogan which alone could cut right through the imperialist plan: Sovereignty of the people first; accession only afterwards. At the same time, he undertook negotiations with both the Dominions for commercial relations and mutual trade.

This was a forthright challenge to the imperialist plan, and demanded an immediate answer. On Oct. 20, 1947, the answer came. Before Kashmir's leaders had time to check and curb the dangerous disruption in Poonch; before they could succeed in transforming the people of Poonch from a reserve of imperialism into a reserve of Kashmir's democratic movement; before they could gather their forces in the Valley to finally throw back the imperialist offensive; before they could cut through the accession slogans finally, and transform the Kashmir issue itself from a ready means of inciting bitterness between India and Pakistan to a bridge-head spanning the gulf between the two—the British launched another and a more deadly frontal attack against the Kashmir people. At the instance of Governor Cunningham and with the aid of notorious British agents like Kuli Khan, an armed attack by pro-British tribes from the North-West Frontier Province was begun.

According to an article in the weekly *People*—

“It goes without saying that the British Government was aware of the large-scale preparations going on in Pakistan for an invasion of Kashmir. According to a Press Note issued by the Government of India, Sir George Cunningham had written about it to Sir R. Lockhart. . . . About two weeks before the raid most English men were evacuated from Kashmir by the British High Commissioner and many British Press men accompanied the Pakistan invaders to Kashmir.” (Feb. 26, 1950.)

The aim of the armed attack was to incite the people of the Valley to communal bitterness and thereby disrupt the National Conference base, to throw the existing administration into panic and confusion, and to seize Srinagar forcibly before the National Conference could assume power.

The Maharaja's bankrupt administration, completely isolated as it was, collapsed in face of the danger. But the common people of Srinagar, led by local National Conference Committees, quickly threw up a network of people's committees to take over the task of administration, organised people's guards to protect the transport and commu-

nication system, ferreted out those underground agents of ex-Premier Kak and the raiders who were known to be planning sabotage to help the raiders, and, under the leadership of the progressive elements of National Conference youth, rapidly organised a national militia to challenge and halt the advancing enemy.

While the common people were thus gathering their forces for armed resistance, and by taking over the administration through people's committees were advancing their struggle in the new conditions, the National Conference leadership appealed to the Indian Government for armed help against the invaders. As a condition of this help Kashmir provisionally acceded to the Indian Union. The accession was, however, subject to ratification by a democratic plebiscite.

The British imperialists were thus thwarted by the people's initiative and resourcefulness in their immediate plans, and began to look around for alternative tactics through which they could gain, if possible by indirect and "peaceful" means, the ends which they had failed to gain by a frontal attack and by force.

The alternative tactics were soon discovered. As the Indian army pushed back the raiders beyond the Uri line the British Press set up a hue and cry that the army operations in Kashmir were resulting in mounting tension between India and Pakistan, and were a grave threat to international peace. The New Delhi correspondent of the *London Times* reported that Indian Government sources had said that "at least two Divisions" of Indian troops would be needed to clear the rebels from Uri-Poonch-Jammu areas.

"This is the limit of India's combat potential, and the Cabinet hesitates to send them in, because it would leave India open to invasion from Pakistan, a possibility which is taken seriously." (Dec. 27, 1947.)

At the same time the New Delhi correspondent of the *Daily Herald* reported that Governor-General Mountbatten had told Nehru bluntly that "if the Indian Cabinet persisted in its present policy in Kashmir a clash with Pakistan was inevitable, and in that case he would not wish to continue in office" (Dec. 21, 1947). The correspondent revealed further that Mountbatten had insisted on either outright partition of Kashmir or on the immediate reference of the issue to the Security Council. . . . On Jan. 1, 1948, the Indian Government complied with Mountbatten's demand, and obligingly handed over the Kashmir question to the Anglo-American-dominated Security Council.

II

The Security Council Takes A Hand

THE terms of India's complaint to the Security Council were, indeed, simple enough—that the invaders were allowed transit across Pakistan and the use of Pakistan's territory as base of operations; that they included Pakistan nationals and drew their military equipment, transportation and supplies from Pakistan, and that Pakistan army officers were training and guiding them in actual fighting.

This, the Indian Government complained, was an "act of aggression", and the Security Council should call upon Pakistan to desist from all such acts. But towards this simple request to face a clear and patent fact known to the world, and splashed in every paper's headlines day after day for three continuous months, what attitude did the Security Council adopt?

For the imperialist-dominated Security Council the nature of India's complaint or the facts of her case were of little importance. For the imperialist Powers what was important was that with India's handing over the Kashmir dispute for their decisions they could proceed at their convenience to tighten their grip over Kashmir. They were now not only in a position to give their own verdict and to take over Kashmir "peacefully" where a forcible seizure had failed, but also in a position to widen the area of dispute between India and Pakistan in whatever direction they pleased, and, by playing one against the other, by prolonging the dispute indefinitely, use Kashmir itself as a means to dominate over both.

Even before the Anglo-American diplomats in Lake Success had spoken their minds in that first Security Council debate, which was to give Indian illusions many a rude jolt and drive many an iron deep into Kashmir's soul, the imperialist-owned newspapers had begun to indicate the blind alley into which the imperialists sought to drive the Kashmir problem.

The leading British and American newspapers pounced upon the Kashmir issue, hurriedly brushed aside the real issue of India's complaint, and, trimming facts to suit their own purpose, began to outline the strategy the imperialists had resolved to undertake.

The New York *Herald-Tribune*, in line with accounts of the Kashmir invasion published earlier in all the Press, still wrote:

“The trouble arose because Muslim tribesmen have been making raids for the last three months into Kashmir.” (Jan. 4, 1948.)

But it was hastily pulled up and corrected by its shrewder contemporary, the *New York Times*, which had its own version of the dispute:

“The dispute over Kashmir arose from the fact that although its inhabitants are predominantly Moham-medans, the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, a Hindu, decided to place his State under India instead of Pakistan, after the two countries became independent last August.” (Jan. 6, 1948.)

This version was promptly taken up in chorus. The *British Express and Star* echoed the American journal with a touching faithfulness, while the *Christian Science Monitor* suggested cautiously, with a truly Christian forbearance and humility, that perhaps the sin lay with him who dared to cast the first reproach.

“It has been the tribesmen’s wish to embroil themselves in fighting in Kashmir that held out promise of . . . revenge for Muslims killed in the communal strife of India. The sympathies of Pakistan’s Muslims had gone with them, since the *Dominion of India’s military operations* have caused deep resentment on this side of the border.” (Jan. 15, 1948 — italics ours.)

And the *Natal Witness* from Malan’s South Africa followed up with a blatancy and brusqueness reminiscent of the masterly art of the “Big Lie”:

“India intervened forcibly in Kashmir . . . with a promptitude which suggested a premeditated decision to hold the country at any cost.” (Jan. 20, 1948.)

From that to an open indictment branding India as the aggressor, and calling upon her to withdraw and let Kashmir remain with Pakistan, as well as to pay indemnities for the damage inflicted, would be but a short and simple step. A few resounding speeches, a few scratches of the pen, a quick turn of the hand—and the trick is done! India should, indeed, be grateful that the Almighty’s judgement is not always terrible and swift but is tempered with mercy. And what greater cause for gratitude could there be than the mild punishment which the *London Economist*, the *London Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* suggest: Not the punishment which follows logically from the findings at which the Anglo-American Press arrived — without, of course, the meddlesome formalities of a tedious debate—

but merely partition; merely holding the scales evenly between India which "intervened forcibly", and Pakistan which was "provoked" to "deep resentment".

But the farce could not be worked out so simply. It was easier to dress up the facts and mock at reality in the remote editorial chambers of the imperialist Press than in the lobbies of the Security Council, where, however much the editorials reflected their own secret intentions, hard facts had to be faced. For over three months the world had heard and read of the full-scale tribal invasion of Kashmir on Oct. 20, an invasion which was itself only the climax to various raids and incursions into Mirpur and Poonch. The fact that these raiders came with the blessings of the Frontier Governor Cunningham, and Premier Abdul Qayyum; the fact that the National Conference organised widespread people's resistance, took over the Government, and provisionally acceded to India only *after* this full-scale invasion; the fact that Indian armies arrived only *after* this accession — these facts were too well known and too well established to be turned upside down overnight.

Besides, of the imperialist Powers, Britain had only recently entered into an alliance with the Indian big bourgeoisie, had gone to the length of sharing power with it to purchase its "goodwill", its readiness to line up actively behind Britain and America in putting down the seething unrest in India and in policing of recalcitrant colonies of South-East Asia. A bargain struck with so much effort and at so great a cost could not be wasted by overhaste or lack of skill.

Time was required, and patience. And sooner or later the cunning imperialists could surely lay their hands on someone willing to pull their chestnuts out of the fire, someone willing to suggest the plans they had in mind—the plans their papers had so tactlessly revealed, but which they themselves would unfold only gradually, carefully and with consummate skill.

Thus, the Canadian *Montreal Daily Star*, discussing the proposal to partition Kashmir which was being stressed repeatedly in the British Press, speculated on the attitude which the British delegation was likely to take:

"There are many reasons of a *rather delicate nature* why Britons, although they may have firm ideas about this case, would like to see other people propose them The British will not sponsor such a plan (of partition — *Author*). Neither would they oppose it." (Jan. 14, 1948.)

And the *Manchester Guardian*, wiser than the rest of the British papers, had reminded: "Perhaps in the end it will be time which will bring about a settlement."

But perhaps the most serious factor cautioning the imperialists to go slow and proceed with a more sober appraisal of the actual situation was the attitude that the Soviet Press had taken up. Alone in the welter of clever half-truths and blatant lies, the Soviet papers, *Izvestia* and *Red Star*, drew pointed attention to the basic realities of the case. The tribal invasion of Kashmir, they pointed out, had been engineered with the knowledge and connivance of British imperialist agents, and that "Sheikh Abdullah is the leader of the democratic people of Kashmir."

Against this background of carefully worked out strategy the debate on India's complaint began. On Jan. 15, India's representative, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, reiterated the actual terms of the complaint made. He stated that India's request was restricted solely to calling upon Pakistan to desist from participation in or aiding of the aggression, and pointedly stressed that the complaint was not regarding Kashmir's territory, its political affiliations or its internal regime.

Pakistan's representative, Mohammed Zafarullah Khan, promptly denied all complicity in the raids and countered India with a list of charges on Junagadh, on allegations of genocide of Muslims in India, and on India's failure to fulfil various inter-Dominion agreements.

The British delegate, Noel Baker, and the American delegate, Warren Austin, pressed India to have "friendly" behind-the-scene talks with Pakistan. And Ayyangar, who had gone to challenge Pakistan for its responsibility in the invasion, and who was now met with Pakistan's blatant and bare-faced denials, and with a long list of counter-charges, accepted the Anglo-American suggestion "with enthusiasm":

"It is appropriate that the Security Council should give my delegation and the Pakistan delegation the opportunity of conferring together to arrive at a solution acceptable to both. I accept the offer for talks willingly and with enthusiasm."

But what was the outcome of these enthusiastic talks? On Jan. 17, Zafarullah announced to the Security Council three proposals which, he claimed, Pakistan had made in a conference with Mountbatten. They were: *First*, the immediate ending of all fighting; *secondly*, the simultaneous withdrawal of Indian forces and those of "outside invaders",

and *thirdly*, arranging for a free plebiscite under joint Indo-Pakistan control.

The Anglo-American delegates and their satellites eagerly seized upon these proposals as the means by which they could successfully intervene in the Kashmir dispute, and brushing aside the realities of India's complaint, came out at once with a proposal for a "neutral" regime under direct and open UN tutelage and control.

"Such a regime," declared the US delegate, Warren Austin, "would have to be as nearly impartial as possible, and the two countries might want it (!) to function under the aegis of the Security Council." (New York *Herald-Tribune*, Jan. 24, 1948.)

In fact, as the *Pioneer* of Allahabad reported—

"The general feeling among Security Council members appears to favour the withdrawal of all non-Kashmiri forces, and the establishment of a neutral administration." (Jan. 28, 1948.)

Eager as reactionary circles in India were, at this time, to line up solidly behind the Anglo-Americans, Birla's *Hindustan Times* saw in all these happenings a blissful dream of a happy "compromise".

"It is believed that a compromise might be found, by placing these troops (Indian and Pakistan) temporarily (!) under Security Council jurisdiction, as a nucleus for an international force.... A compromise appears to be possible by the creation of a neutral interim administration which might be composed of elements drawn from all contending parties *in addition to some from the United Nations*. As the US delegate suggested, the question of a permanent Government for Kashmir could be raised after the holding of a plebiscite." (Jan. 26, 1948.)

But these dreams were destined to founder on hard reality. While Ayyangar was working himself up to fervid enthusiasm, the Security Council Chairman, Belgium delegate Langanhove, moved yet another step in the attempt to intervene in the Indian and Pakistan internal situation. The agenda before the Security Council, which, India had repeatedly stressed, was limited to calling upon Pakistan to refrain from aiding the invaders, was changed from the "Jammu and Kashmir case" to the "India-Pakistan dispute". India's vigorous protests were brushed aside and the debate on genocide begun.

The Soviet delegate, Gromyko, alone amongst the Security Council members, rose to protest against this change, as being illegal, and as not having been permitted by the Security Council. He alone pointed out that it was a deliberate move by the imperialists to widen the area of dispute, to enable them to intervene more directly in the internal affairs of both India and Pakistan.

A few days later the world learnt that the "friendly" talks had broken down. Promptly Langanhove introduced a resolution, calling for a "neutral administration and a plebiscite under Security Council control." And equally promptly his first attack was followed by a rapid succession of blows. The big guns of the Security Council boomed out fiercely, subjecting the Indian delegation to concentrated and withering fire.

"The cause of all the troubles in Kashmir," declared the Argentine representative, Dr. Jose Arce, "is that the struggle of the people has been considered a rebellion, and they have been regarded as cattle and not as men." (*Times of India*, Feb. 4, 1948.)

"It is my conviction," threatened Noel Baker, "that raids and incidents will go on until the question of Kashmir is settled. As long as fear dominates the minds of the people in the Punjab and in Kashmir, incidents will continue." (*Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1948.)

"How are you going to ask the tribesmen to retire?" asked Warren Austin. "Only when they are satisfied that there will be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim Government can you have a peaceful settlement." (*Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1948.)

India listened, staggered and stunned. In vain did Ayyangar plead that the future of the State was not the issue of dispute at all.

"This is a field in which the Security Council has no jurisdiction. The matter is entirely for the jurisdiction of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and its people." (Ayyangar's speech, *Pioneer*, Feb. 5, 1948.)

In vain did Sheikh Abdullah intervene to remind the Security Council:

"What is the point of the dispute? It is not the sovereignty of the prince. It is not the allegation of maladministration. The dispute is the invasion by tribesmen helped by the Pakistan Government. . . . The United Nations has no right to displace a legal Government. . . . Did the Council expect to find in Kashmir any

individual whom they could regard as neutral on the question of accession, or was it the Council's intention that the people of Kashmir should have no hand in running their own country?" (*New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1948.)

But the Anglo-American majority which dominated the Security Council was not prepared to listen. They had shown patience enough. Legal Government or not, Sheikh Abdullah's regime had thwarted their plans of domination and upset their calculations. Now it must go. A "neutral" regime of their own supporters must be set up. The widest possible powers must be ensured to their nominee going as Plebiscite Administrator. He was to be virtually a super Commander-in-Chief of the Armies, a super Inspector-General of Police, a Magistrate-in-Chief and, of course, a super Prime Minister and Cabinet unto himself. Only if all this were conceded, only if Kashmir surrendered without a murmur and handed itself over to them, only then would the tribesmen be withdrawn and the fighting be called off. Refuse—and the imperialists knew how to bring India and her like to her senses!

Gone was the suave pleading of the polished British diplomat; to India's shocked amazement America's mailed fist was shown. Immediately Delhi was agog with the rumour that the Anglo-Americans had threatened India that in case of a refusal to accept their decision, India's supply of petrol and other vital commodities would be cut off. Outside the Soviet Union, it must be remembered, the Anglo-Americans had a virtual monopoly of petrol.

It was openly mentioned in National Conference circles that, panic-stricken, the Government of India had referred the question of alternative sources of petrol to its leading Science Advisers. It was reported that a certain associate of some National Conference leaders had been to see the Government of India's leading Science Adviser in this connection, and had politely suggested that the cutting off of Anglo-American supply of petrol was no problem at all. The Soviet Union possessed enormous supplies, and the Government of India had only to approach her to get what they wanted for the asking. Our leading scientific luminary is reported to have thrown up his hands in horror: "Petrol from the Soviet Union? Don't you realise, my dear friend, that the Government of India is not prepared to have anything to do with that country!"

It is significant that although political circles continued to deny this reported Anglo-American threat, it had its first

open confirmation exactly two years later, from no less a person than Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir. Speaking at Jammu on March 7, 1950, Bakshi Sahib revealed:

“The Anglo-American bloc wanted to bind its decisions on India by threats and coercion. Recently they had threatened to stop allotment of petrol etc. to India, if she did not accept the Macnoughton formula.” (*Indian News Chronicle*, March 8, 1950.)

To those who are aware today of the deliberate sabotage by K. M. Munshi and other reactionary elements, of Soviet and Chinese offers of foodgrains, the decision of the Indian Government to have no truck with the Soviet Union, even if Soviet help was the only way in which India could save Kashmir's freedom and save her own national honour, would come as no surprise. The helplessness with which India knuckled under to the insolent Anglo-American threats was only the inevitable and logical outcome of her basic economic and political policies. Those were the days when American Ambassador, Grady, was touring up and down the country, delivering speeches, issuing a string of Press statements attacking India's protection to her infant national industries, advocating the lowering of tariff walls to dump Indian markets with cheap American goods, pressing for the abandonment of nationalisation, and insolently demanding a “clear picture of the Government of India's policy towards labour and private capital.” (*Statesman*, Nov. 1, 1947.)

Those were the days when, encouraged by Grady's open and undisguised interference in India's internal policies, powerful industrialists like Tata and Birla, in cooperation with reactionary circles inside the Congress, had launched a vigorous campaign criticising the programme of nationalisation to which the Congress was pledged, and demanding ruthless suppression of the working-class movement, along with other “guarantees” to Indian capitalists.

Birla, addressing the shareholders of his United Commercial Bank, said:

“The State in India does manage large business, railway, telephone and telegraphs, but the experience has been that under the pressure of public opinion the State can neither economise nor increase so easily the cost of the consumer, with the result that, as everyone can see, there is inefficiency.”

And J. R. D. Tata, addressing the annual meeting of the Tata Iron & Steel Company, had spoken up against Govern-

ment awards in labour disputes, and had demanded firm action against the working class:

“What seems to be required is sympathetic yet firm action by Government in dealing with unlawful strikes in particular.”

Under pressure of the American bosses and their Indian servitors, the Government promptly called an Industrial Truce Conference to prohibit working-class strikes; organised the INTUC to disrupt the working-class movement; struck ferociously at the leadership of the working class and peasantry, banning the Communist Party in Bengal and launching a country-wide offensive to arrest thousands of known trade-union and peasant leaders; signed the Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation, lowering India's trade barriers and pledging to give equal protection to foreign and indigenous capital, and then publicly announced, much to the delight of American and Indian big business, that it had abandoned its programme of nationalisation “for a period of ten years.”

Those were also the days when reactionary circles in India sought to follow up these initial victories by tying India openly and more closely to the Anglo-American apron-strings, demanding that the Nehru Government completely throw overboard its protestations of “neutrality” in foreign affairs. Patel's Home Department, and the Industry Departments under his nominees, having proved their *bona fides*, Nehru's Foreign Department must now completely fall in line. Referring to the “favourable” internal situation created in India by the wholesale suppression of the democratic and working-class movement, Birla's *Eastern Economist* declared:

“We gained nothing in the USSR from a protestation of innocence but we did fail to cash in on a domestic situation which placed us well with the United States. This was the barren fruit of a policy of attempted neutrality.”

In the eyes of the Birlas and Tatas it was only this “attempted neutrality”, this hesitation to line up completely behind the imperialist Powers, that was bringing the wrath of the Anglo-American gods on India's head. If India wanted to win their favour it must propitiate the gods further, completely and without any reservation. India must bow its head still lower, as low at least as Pakistan.

“If India were outside the Commonwealth when these differences (with Pakistan) arose and Pakistan

within it, Commonwealth forces as well as sympathy may well be used against us, whatever the merit of the dispute." (*Eastern Economist*, July 23, 1948.)

And so, just at the time when Kashmir's fate had been handed over to the decision of the Anglo-American masters, the race to outbid Pakistan in winning their favours, in proving themselves equally loyal and dependable servitors of the imperialist will, was begun. The race continued unchecked with ever-gathering momentum, for full three years, until, by the beginning of 1951, it was seen to have resulted in complete and total disaster for Kashmir's national movement. . . .

III

Kashmir Prepares for Struggle

MEANWHILE, having discovered to their intense satisfaction that every act of pressure and intimidation only brought a more and more servile and abject response from the Indian Government, the Anglo-Americans only grew more brazen-faced and bolder. They insolently brushed aside Sheikh Abdullah's objections and Ayyangar's pleas, intent on seizing upon the Kashmir dispute to push through their plans of intervention.

"All the conciliation proposals thus far," reported the Canadian *Montreal Daily Star*, "have concentrated on the establishment of a neutral regime to govern Kashmir." (Feb. 7, 1948.)

"Mr. Austin's statement", noted the *New York Times*, "was considered a setback for the Indian delegation which had steadfastly claimed that the Government of Kashmir was an internal matter, and not an affair for the United Nations." (Feb. 4, 1948.)

The Indian delegate struggled pitifully to extricate the Kashmir problem from the mess into which his servile dependence on the Anglo-Americans had got it. We had come with complete faith, Ayyangar wailed. "But it seems that the Security Council generally did not sympathise with the Indian case." He would have to talk matters over with his Government, and he requested for a brief adjournment, just a few days. Anticipating no serious objection to this request, he said, he had provisionally booked his passage.

This was the signal for a general uproar in which accusations were freely hurled, and the Anglo-American satellites thundered and fumed.

"India's recall of its delegates for talks", the New York *Herald-Tribune* insinuated darkly, "came after the Council had clearly veered towards proposals which would set up a neutral interim administration for Kashmir, and require withdrawal of Indian forces before a plebiscite."

"For Ayyangar to book his passage without first learning the wishes of the Security Council," thundered Columbian delegate, Dr. Alfonso Lopez, "is to flout the Council. For that body's own dignity it should meet again tomorrow, and keep on meeting until it had reached some decision." (*Montreal Daily Star*, Feb. 11, 1948.)

Pakistan's Zafarullah sat and stroked his beard in undisguised amusement, as Ayyangar, stung to the quick, rose to protest:

"My country has not been treated with the dignity to which it is entitled. A simple request for time to consult with the home Government was being examined with great suspicion. I have been too much twitted today." (*New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1948.)

The Ukrainian delegate, Tarasenko, alone rose to intervene.

"There was no doubt about the need for adjournment", he said. "And the Council should not even try to limit the period of adjournment, as it could not fix the time required to consult with the home Government. If the Anglo-American majority was not prepared to agree to this plain and simple request let them refuse it openly. Let votes be taken and recorded on this request." (*People's Age*, Feb. 29, 1948.)

Afraid to face the Soviet challenge to come out in the open with their opposition, the Anglo-Americans and their stooge majority quietened down. Permission to return home was given on the distinct understanding that the *status quo* would be maintained until India's return. (*Vide* US delegate's speech, *People's Age*, Feb. 29, 1948.)

But, in fact, the *status quo* was not maintained. While the Indian delegate was away, the Security Council proceeded to take up "aspects of the India-Pakistan Question

other than those relating to Jammu and Kashmir", including, as the foreign Press reported, "allegations of Indian aggression against Pakistan."

By this time the astute British diplomats had begun to notice that all was not well, and that perhaps the American mailed fist had been thrust under India's nose too soon.

The London *Times* thus observed:

"In India opinion continues to be much exercised over what is considered to be the lack of sympathy with which the Security Council received its complaint against Pakistan on the score of the war in Kashmir. . . . Addressing a public meeting at Jammu in Kashmir, Mr. Nehru expressed disappointment and surprise at the way the Security Council had handled India's reference to it of the Kashmir issue. Instead of discussing and deciding it in a straightforward manner the nations of the world sitting in the Security Council got lost in power politics." (Feb. 21, 1948.)

Perhaps some pretence of a retreat, some relaxation of the screws, some further exercise of caution and patience may yet bring the Indians to walk smiling and bowing into the spider's web, where force and bluster may not drag them. A highly sensitive people these Orientals, as the *Manchester Guardian* had earlier noted, jealous of their dignity and self-respect. Not the sort who would stand being pushed about. But humour their self-respect and feeling of national pride, and you could do with them whatever you will.

And so, as soon as Ayyangar returned from India, opportunity was taken of the Chinese delegate Dr. Tsiang's chairmanship to bring the Indians again to the "family table" and to initiate a new round of "friendly talks" and "conciliation" proposals. Dr. Tsiang's proposals began with a minor sop to India. The plebiscite remained, as before, the first point to be discussed and arranged for, under the supervision of the Security Council. The Abdullah regime was sought to be removed or subordinated, as before, to a Chief of Interim Administration, nominated by the Security Council to run the Government until the plebiscite. But provision was made for the maintenance of some Indian forces for the security of the State.

Hardly had the Indian newspapers signified their Government's willingness to approve of the Chinese proposals than Noel Baker, having got the Indian delegates to resume negotiations again, proceeded promptly to close the trap.

“Azad Kashmir” representatives, he insisted, must be included on a “full and equal” basis in the Kashmir Cabinet under a UN Head of Interim Regime, and a Committee of Assessors representing both India and Pakistan must be associated with the Plebiscite Administrator.

On April 21, 1948, a resolution was finally passed. A bare perusal of its provisions shows that all the obnoxious points of the previous proposals were there, though dressed up respectably, their naked ugliness hidden from view. A five-man Commission was to be appointed to supervise the cease-fire, a temporary truce and the withdrawal of armed forces. A Plebiscite Administrator was to take the place of what was previously called the “Head of the Interim Administration”, and was, as before, to have powers of direction and supervision over the State’s armed forces and police; power to nominate and appoint Special Magistrates; power to communicate over the head of Sheikh Abdullah’s Government with the Security Council and with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and indeed all such powers as he himself “considers necessary for the plebiscite.”

At the same time Sheikh Abdullah’s Government was to be replaced by a so-called “neutral Cabinet” including Azad Kashmir representatives, or “representatives of major parties and political groups” as the resolution euphemistically called them, to share “equally and fully in the administration at Cabinet level.”

The former three-man Committee of Assessors was to be retained in the shape of a representative nominated each by Pakistan and India, to be attached to the Commission. Indeed, in this detailed plan for open and direct intervention in the internal affairs of Kashmir, an intervention specially barred by the Articles of the United Nations Charter, only on one point was a concession made to India. The Anglo-Americans did not demand a complete withdrawal of the Indian army, but the retention of “the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power, and in maintenance of law and order”, to be stationed subject to the “advice” of the Security Council Commission.

The resolution was greeted in Kashmir by an angry wave of resentment and indignation. The National Conference met forthwith on April 22, 1948, a day after its passage, and scornfully rejected it.

“The General Council of the National Conference is of the opinion that the resolution is yet another feature of power politics on which the Security Council has embarked ever since its inception. Right from the

time the issue of Kashmir was referred to the Security Council, some members had been at pains to make capital out of the issue for their own designs... Some members even suggested that the Security Council should have a direct hand in the administration of Kashmir.

“The General Council wishes to make it clear for all times that it will brook no interference from any quarter in the newly won freedom attained by the people after bitter struggle extending over 17 years... The General Council rejects this resolution in toto and calls upon the people to resist this decision... The General Council calls upon the popular Government to arm the people and to take immediate steps to mobilise the entire nation for this purpose.”

Moving the resolution with a fighting speech, Maulana Syed Masoodi, General Secretary of the National Conference, declared:

“In regard to the Kashmir issue the imperialist Powers like America and Britain had made out Pakistan as the innocent party. This was being done to further their own ends with a view to establish bases here for the coming war...” (*Khidmat*, April 28, 1948.)

Sheikh Abdullah was equally outspoken.

“The strange attitude shown by the imperialist Powers convinced him (Sh. Abdullah) that nothing could come out of the talks, and he had accordingly asked Mr. Ayyangar to withdraw the case altogether... Mr. Noel Baker flatly denied the complicity of Pakistan in the raids, which, he said, were of local origin... When asked how he had come to judge things at such a great distance, he said he had received direct information... Mr. Warren Austin insisted on ‘a neutral’ administration for Kashmir, which, he frankly said, would include a few members of the Security Council... Most of the members saw Kashmir only as a neighbour of Russia and therefore an essential base in the encirclement of Russia for future aggression.” (*Ibid.*)

Kashmir was a dangerous volcano seething with revolt. Indeed, India itself was shocked and alarmed. Political parties were up in arms. The common man, brought up for 30 years in a fighting tradition of anti-imperialism, was angered and aroused. For 17 years he had watched Kashmir

battle stubbornly and tenaciously for freedom. He could not allow it now to lower the flag before foreign Powers, to go down without even the semblance of a fight.

The Government of India noted the people's mood and decided to stiffen its back. On April 25, Ayyangar reiterated India's objections to the Security Council's naked and direct interference in the internal regime and political affiliations of Kashmir, and said:

"It will now be for my Government to decide in the circumstances so created what its course of action will be to end the fighting and take a plebiscite." (*Statesman*, April 25, 1948.)

But was this India's last word or was it only a plea for time to consider and decide? Was it a total and final rejection, a determination to break off all discussions, or only pressure to secure some amendments?

On May 7, Vellodi stated on behalf of the Indian delegation:

"There can be no question of the Commission proceeding to implement the resolution on Kashmir until the objections raised by the Government of India have been satisfactorily met."

But simultaneously India proceeded to nominate a country to serve on its behalf on the five-man Commission. The language of the speeches was, indeed, sharp and stern—but what did this gesture indicate? The Security Council members were unable to decide, and thought it best to wait and watch before making up their mind.

The *London Times* was quick to note the lack of decisiveness in the Indian stand and to indicate the most fruitful tactical direction:

"At the same time both Governments indicated that they would not oppose the arrival of the Kashmir Commission on the spot and might cooperate with it.... This is a most encouraging feature of the deliberations.... If both Governments had decided on a completely negative position they would not have appointed their own selected representatives to serve on the Commission.... When a neutral body reaches Kashmir it will by its very presence tend to create a stabilising mediatory atmosphere." (May 8, 1948.)

A few days later, on May 20, India moved again. Politely and cautiously, Pillai wrote on behalf of the Indian delegation that India was unable to undertake the obligations

placed on her by the present resolution "unless it is amended in the directions indicated."

At once Warren Austin was besides himself with rage. Acceptance or no acceptance, co-operation or no co-operation, the Commission shall proceed on its appointed course. It shall go to the spot and set up the plebiscite machinery.

"We notice," he thundered, "that there does not seem to be any sense of obligation on parties who use the expensive machinery of the United Nations to respect the judgement at which the Commission arrives Now we are told that they will not implement some of the most important articles of our recommendations. That is an absurd position for the United Nations to be in It is not only morally wrong. It is not in conformity with the spirit of the Charter. If parties come to us for the settlement of the dispute they must abide by the Commission's decisions." (*Civil & Military Gazette*, May 28, 1948.)

Badgered and bullied into silence, the *Hindustan Times* wailed:

"The Indians after yesterday's meeting were somewhat surprised at the new American 'get-tough' policy, particularly in view of the fact that the Security Council has in the past accepted non-compliance with its resolutions with a certain meekness." (May 25, 1948.)

But before its complaint could make itself heard, the Security Council proceeded to further tighten the screws. On June 3, having got the five-man Commission into existence with the willing compliance of both India and Pakistan, and having instructed it to proceed to India forthwith without much ceremony or delay, it went on to widen the Commission's scope to include the entire range of India-Pakistan Question, the question of Junagadh, the allegations of genocide of Indian Muslims, and a multitude of inter-governmental agreements between India and Pakistan.

Nehru protested vigorously, but in vain. The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), as it was called, proceeded relentlessly on its appointed course. And, after a spate of rumours that it would first meet in London to draw on the expert advice of Mr. Noel Baker, in the first week of July 1948 it set foot on Indian soil.

The *People's Age* again warned India and Kashmir that unless they awoke immediately to the real nature of the Commission they were well on the road to disaster:

“When the Kashmir issue was put before the UNO the Soviet representative warned that a UNO Commission would do no good, and he cited the case of the Commission on Indonesia which had become an agency of imperialist intervention. But Ayyangar, intent on flattering the imperialists, and having pathetic faith in them.... stuck to his demand for UNO intervention There was not one member in the AICC to ask Pt. Nehru how we could remain neutral when the Anglo-American bloc through the Security Council had launched open aggression in Kashmir.... This so-called policy of neutrality.... has brought not only humiliation to India’s Government but also created the danger of Anglo-American aggression. *What is at stake is the liberty and freedom of the people of Kashmir.* (May 9, 1948.)

IV

The Road To Compromise

BY the time the Commission was to land in Karachi, Kashmir’s patriots were already discarding their illusions one by one. The amazing proceedings of the Security Council, the callousness with which their country’s case had been bandied about, the cynicism with which the imperialist Powers had got together to sidetrack their simple complaint and to cover up the real issue in a web of intricate lies, the deliberateness with which entirely irrelevant issues were manufactured and seized upon in an undisguised attempt to find some pretext for intervening to overthrow their internal regime, had already opened their eyes.

Through its own proceedings and with its own hands the Security Council had torn from its face every shred of neutrality and impartiality that they had once believed it to possess.

Nor was the composition of the Commission likely to win Kashmir’s confidence, weighed heavily, as it was, with just those countries that had proved themselves most zealous in demanding the subversion of Kashmir’s National Government to foreign domination: America itself, with its loyal satellites, Belgium, Columbia and Argentina.

Nothing good, the National Conference realised, could come out of “negotiating” with such a Commission. The Commission must be told plainly and bluntly that Kashmir had had enough of the Lake Success farce. And Kashmir

itself must gather its forces to meet and fight the latest threat. Towards that end the energies of every National Conference worker must be bent.

The *Indian Nation* of Patna reported:

“The policy of the Kashmir Government has been clearly stated by Sheikh Abdullah. Both the people of Kashmir and the Government are opposed even to the entry of the Commission into the State, and have justified this attitude on the ground that the Kashmir case was deliberately made a pawn in the game of power politics at Lake Success. The fact that the Commission is over-weighted in favour of Pakistan has led to an uneasy tension all over Kashmir.” (*Indian Nation*, July 3, 1948.)

The National Conference resolution of April 22, calling upon the people to prepare for armed resistance to imperialist intervention, had electrified the atmosphere. Anger and defiance were in the air. The younger elements of the National Conference were eagerly on the move. They gathered together in small meetings, taking stock of the situation, reviewing their forces, working out the ways and means of giving battle to imperialist intervention. An open boycott of the Commission was on everyone’s lips. The ranks of the National Conference turned their thoughts to those momentous days in 1929 when the Simon Commission had been sent out to India, when an angry storm of black flags had enveloped the earth, and, like a mighty thunderclap, “Go Back Simon” had rent the skies — and dreamt fondly of living again in the glory of those days.

The *London Times* was quick again to note this darkening mood:

“Indian opinion was definitely hostile towards the Commission and newspapers reflected this hostility. . . . while in Kashmir itself Sheikh Abdullah’s regime was averse from allowing the Commission to set foot in the State, and felt that public resentment might take the form of black-flag demonstrations.” (July 11, 1948.)

Kashmir was, indeed, a seething cauldron of indignation and revolt. The people waited with tense expectation for the gathering storm to burst.

But those who between themselves were deciding Kashmir’s fate, had other plans. The open public debates, published daily in every newspaper and followed eagerly by the entire people of Kashmir, had, they realised, led to this dangerous hardening of the people’s mood. But quiet,

behind-the-scene negotiations, from which the people were carefully eliminated, would perhaps produce better results.

The open Security Council debates were now to be replaced by the secret "negotiations" of the Commission. The Commission, in its turn, warned beforehand of the explosive situation in Kashmir, decided to begin its task by sugar-coating its tactics.

In reply to a letter from Nehru, asking the Commission for clarification about its proposed programme and work, R. J. Siri, Commission's Chairman, was politely evasive and profuse with honey-sweet assurances. We come only with the sincerest intentions, he swore. We come only to be of some humble service to you. If you will only discuss matters with us, and give us your co-operation, everything will be all right.

Nehru, whose Government was repentently retracing the harsh words the Security Council's "get-tough" tactics had provoked, responded with a gesture which was sweeter still.

"My Government," he telegraphed the Commission on June 26, "note that the Commission is coming to the Indian sub-continent with the most sincerest desire to be of real service to them as well as to the Pakistan Government for the settlement of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. . . . The Government of India will be glad to confer with the Commission when it arrives in Delhi. We shall also give what assistance we can. . . . Arrangements will be made for a senior officer to maintain liaison between the Government of India and the Commission during the latter's stay in New Delhi."

The next day Nehru flew off to Srinagar, accompanied by Baldev Singh, Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, V. P. Menon, Secretary of the States Ministry, H. M. Patel, Secretary of the Defence Ministry, and entered into long and protracted confabulations with Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Cabinet.

The results of these discussions were known in a few days.

"It is even suggested", reported the *Indian Nation*, "that Pandit Nehru had been to Kashmir to soften the opposition of Sheikh Abdullah to the UN Commission. Misgivings are still there. If the Commission places facts before the Security Council in a way damaging to the Government of India and to Sheikh Abdullah's administration, will not the position of India be further weakened? India should move cautiously in this matter." (July 11, 1948.)

But in its misgivings the *Indian Nation* seemed to find itself alone. The capitalist-owned Indian Press, and particularly the *Hindustan Times*, had already begun to talk of "conditional co-operation" and of "willing co-operation" if the Commission got Pakistan to "behave."

The *London Times* had, of course, every reason to be pleased with the outcome:

"It is evident that in recent weeks there has been some softening in India's attitude towards the Commission itself. . . . Realising that such treatment (boycott or non-co-operation—*Author*) would hardly redound to India's credit or advantage. . . . the Indian Cabinet discussed the matter at length and. . . decided to extend all facilities and courtesies to the Commission while on Indian soil." (July 11, 1948.)

And Kashmir's patriots, who were straining impatiently at the leash, preparing their forces for a final, last-ditch battle, learnt to their bitter disappointment that the battle was not to be. The National Conference resolution of April 22, 1948, calling upon them for armed resistance, was not to be acted upon. Considerations of "international politics" and "Governmental prestige" demanded that they must co-operate with the UNCIP, and watch quietly and patiently as a decision on their fate was dragged out interminably, against their will.

The movement of spontaneous anger, the movement to rescue themselves from the Security Council before its grip closed finally on their throats, was scattered even before it was begun!

By the middle of July the Commission settled down comfortably to its work, and, step by step, slowly, almost imperceptibly, that process began in which the Commission unfolded the imperialist plan bit by bit; the political stalemate was made to drag on endlessly; Kashmir's internal situation deteriorated and became more and more complicated, and India's leaders were dragged deeper and deeper into the quagmire of compromise and surrender.

In Delhi and Karachi the Commission began by meeting Nehru and Rajagopalachari, Liaquat Ali and Zafarullah, the Indian C.-in-C., General Butcher, and the Pakistan C.-in-C., General Gracey, Bajpai and Vellodi and Pakistan Secretary-General, Mohammed Ali.

In Srinagar they sent out an "advance party", and a few days later a sub-committee which was received at the aerodrome by the Deputy Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed.

In Delhi and Karachi the Commission probed its way forward cautiously, beginning with a pious and platitudinous appeal, requesting both Governments to "refrain from all steps calculated to worsen the situation." The Government of India replied with an assurance that it would continue its best efforts to give effect to the Commission's appeal.

In Srinagar the Commission's sub-committee proceeded to meet Kashmir's Cabinet Ministers, and, without much beating about the bush, promptly demanded an "elucidation" from Mirza Afzal Beg, the Revenue Minister, of the proposed land reforms.

Not content with thus poking their nose into the Kashmir Government's own internal policies of land reform, undeterred by the fact that this was a subject entirely irrelevant to the Commission's particular studies, a subject in which the Commission was supposed to have neither jurisdiction nor interest, the *London Times* announced that the Commission would soon launch an extensive "economic and political survey" of the Valley. (August 27, 1948.)

On September 6, the *New York Herald-Tribune* announced that the economic-political survey was begun under the guidance of the Pakistan representative on the UNCIP, Carlos Leguizamon of Argentina.

In Delhi and Karachi the Commission put out feelers for a cease-fire and truce.

In Srinagar, while its "political survey" was still going on, it promptly wired the UN Secretary-General for the services of forty Military Observers. At the time the telegram arrived in Lake Success the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, happened to be the Security Council's Chairman for the month. He suggested that the Military Observers should be selected from all the five nations represented on the Commission. He cited the example of Palestine where the USA, France and Belgium were serving on the Palestine Truce Commission, and where Observers were drawn equally from all these three countries.

The UN Secretarial staff resisted this simple suggestion, insisting on selecting the Observers themselves, mainly from the American army. Jacob Malik, as Chairman, convened a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this question. At once a minor storm was whipped up in the American Press. The *New York Herald-Tribune* and the *New York Times* criticised Malik's suggestion, stating quite frankly that in quoting the Palestine example Malik was obviously anxious to ensure that Military Observers were drawn also from the country which India had nominated to

the Commission, i.e. from Czechoslovakia. In the Security Council meeting, delegate after delegate rose to rebuke Malik sharply for having dared to mention such a dangerous proposal, and by an overwhelming majority the suggestion was voted down.

The UN Secretariat proceeded with its own election, and 26 Observers were sent down from the American army, 8 each from Canada and Belgium, and 2 from Norway.

Meanwhile, hardly had the negotiations for a cease-fire begun than reports began to appear — significantly enough first in the British Press — that Pakistan's British C.-in-C., General Gracey, had admitted before the Commission the presence and participation of the Pakistan regular army in the fighting in Kashmir. The report was denied by a Pakistan Government *communiqué*. But the British Press persisted in the story, while the London *Observer* went further and openly indicated the advantages of such an admission.

“Though the Pakistan Government has repudiated a reported admission to the UN Commission that Pakistan troops are fighting Indian troops in Kashmir, yet there seems no doubt that they had been there since May. The general belief is that *Pakistan is out to establish its position before the UN Commission can recommend partition of the State, which indeed is the only solution.*” (August 8, 1948 — italics ours.)

A valuable hint which Pakistan's ruling classes were not too dull-witted to catch!

It will be remembered that when earlier during the Lake Success debates, Zafarullah had vigorously denied Pakistan's complicity in the tribal invasion, Sheikh Abdullah had promptly retorted that if Pakistan was neither a participant nor an abettor in the invasion it could claim no *locus standi* in the Kashmir dispute. Hence the Anglo-Americans' deliberate attempt to afford Pakistan a position of equality with India, and to drag it back, in face of its persistent denials, as an equal participant in the dispute, was indefensible in the extreme. Hence, also, all the carefully manufactured arguments on which the Anglo-Americans based their plans for a foreign-dominated “neutral” Government and a foreign-controlled plebiscite, all the feeble pretexts through which they sought to cover up and justify their open intervention in Kashmir's internal affairs, fell to the ground. Hence, obviously, the only responsibility the Security Council could justifiably undertake was to call upon Pakistan to refuse the use of its territory to the tribal

raiders, and to leave the people of Kashmir to decide for themselves their internal regime and their political affiliations.

The logic of the contention was obvious — and extremely dangerous for the Anglo-American plans. And so, before the Indian Government could bring itself to utilise it, and before Sheikh Abdullah could extricate Kashmir from the intricate knots into which she was being tied by the imperialists, this risky loophole too was covered up. General Gracey, Pakistan's British C.-in-C., insisted, as Zafarullah revealed two years later, that the Pakistan army must move directly into battle.

"If", he warned the Pakistan Government, "Pakistan does not want to be faced with another big refugee problem; if India was not to be allowed to sit at the doorstep of Pakistan; if the civilian and army morale was not to be undermined, it is imperative that the Indian army is not allowed to move beyond the Uri line." (Quoted in Zafarullah's speech to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, August 28, 1950.)

The backstage arrangements were now complete, and had been worked out with an admirable consistency of purpose, notwithstanding the numerous hands which had cooperated to fill in the details. A British Cabinet Mission carves up a whole sub-continent in one bold and masterly stroke, leaving whole chunks of territory, bigger than most European countries, floating out like atoms in a vacuum, free to coalesce with one Dominion or the other. A British Governor, Cunningham, organises a full-scale invasion against one such territory, Kashmir, to destroy by force its national movement, to ensure that it does not, by some unhappy accident, coalesce with the wrong Dominion. A British Governor-General, Mountbatten, intervenes when his colleague Cunningham's invasion misfires and insists on bringing in the intervention of the Security Council. A British delegate, Noel Baker, denies that there has been any such thing as an invasion, although his own agents had been busy in planning and organising it, and insists that the "local" "people's revolt" which had taken place, can be solved only if the popular Government, which they failed to overthrow by force of arms, is removed, and a plebiscite is held under the aegis of the Security Council.

And finally, a British C.-in-C., Gracey, enters the scene just in time to fill in the last minor detail, without which one party to the dispute could not be paraded as a party at

all, and the dispute itself, which they were inflating so painstakingly, would collapse like a burst bubble.

The stage arrangements being now complete, the Indian Government, too, proceeded to roll off its set and rotund speeches, pathetically unaware that the role allotted to it was not of the hero in a moving tragedy but of the simpleton in a cheap and insulting farce.

V

The Plot Thickens

A GAINST this background of hurried manoeuvrings, the UNCIP formally adopted and presented to both the Governments a resolution proposing a cease-fire. The resolution (August 13, 1948) proposed: (a) an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, to be carried into effect simultaneously on both sides of the fighting line; UN Military Observers to supervise the implementation and maintenance of the cease-fire; (b) "the presence of Pakistan troops in the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State" having created an "entirely new and unforeseen (!) situation", Pakistan should withdraw its forces and also "use its best endeavours" to secure the withdrawal of "tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not nominally resident in Kashmir." At the same time, India was also to withdraw the bulk of her armed forces, retaining only the minimum required for security and the maintenance of law and order. The areas evacuated by Pakistan troops would be administered by "local authorities" under the surveillance of the UNCIP. And (c) the Governments of India and Pakistan were both to reaffirm their desire to allow the people of the State to decide their accession to India or Pakistan through the "democratic procedure" of a "free plebiscite."

Within a week of receiving the cease-fire resolution the Government of India informed the Commission, by a letter dated August 20, 1948, that it had accepted it, "animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace and thus uphold the principles and prestige of the United Nations."

However, as was revealed sometime later, the Government of India made two important reservations regarding para (b) of the resolution and brought them to the Commission's notice.

The first reservation was with regard to the highly strategic areas in the north of the Valley—Gilgit, Skardu

and areas of Ladakh. The Government of India pointed out that in these areas skirmishes of a local nature were taking place aided by groups of tribal raiders. The Indian army was currently moving its units up to these remote and inaccessible territories and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir had every intention to send its officers and re-establish the administration there. The Government of India maintained that as no widespread organised resistance had occurred in these territories, they could not be put on a level with the "Azad Kashmir territory" to the west of Kashmir, and the "local authorities" stipulated in the Commission's cease-fire resolution could only mean local officers recruited by the Jammu and Kashmir Government and owing loyalty to it.

The Commission acknowledged this reservation, and in a letter to Nehru, dated August 25, 1948, said evasively, in a vague and equivocal sentence which was open to varied interpretations and to which various members of the Commission were later to give contradictory interpretations: "It (the Commission) believes that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the resolution."

The second reservation of the Indian Government was at a later date, and was in respect of the disarmament and disbandment of the "Azad Forces."

It must be noted in this connection that in the correspondence over the cease-fire resolution, which the Commission published in September 1948, the Commission mentioned two significant admissions that Zafarullah had made to it: *first*, on August 4, that the "Pakistan army was at present responsible for the overall command of the Azad Kashmir Forces." And *second*, on August 9, that the "Azad Kashmir Forces were operationally controlled by the Pakistan army."

Armed with this information as the Commission was, it would seem obvious that in preparing its cease-fire resolution just four days later, the Commission would either specifically call upon Pakistan to disarm and disband these forces, or that it would assume that with the withdrawal of Pakistan's armed forces the Azad Forces under Pakistan's "overall command" would also logically and automatically be wound up and cease to exist.

The resolution, of course, remained silent on this point. And after India had signified its acceptance of the treacherously vague resolution, S. Ibrahim, head of the "Azad Kashmir Council", came forward to contradict Zafarullah's stand.

“The Azad Kashmir Government is not subservient to the Government of Pakistan, and if the UN Commission enters into any unilateral agreement with the Pakistan Government over the cease-fire order, we will not agree to it.” (*Tribune*, August 28, 1948.)

It was only four months later when the cease-fire proposals were presented again at the General Assembly session of the UNO in Paris, that the Government of India sought clarification of this point. The Columbian Chairman of the Commission, Alfonso Lozano, and the American Principal Secretary, Eric Colban, met Nehru in person on December 20 and 22, and the entire field of the cease-fire, the truce and the other prerequisites of the plebiscite were surveyed and discussed.

A fortnight later an *Aide Memoire* covering these discussions was published in the Indian Press. It is an amazing document, showing a startling reversal of the traditional roles. Nehru seeks elucidation after clarification; Nehru, growing bolder, raises objection after objection — and the American and Columbian diplomats dare not even demur! Lozano and Colban quietly agree!

Nehru suggests that India could accept the plebiscite proposals only after Pakistan implements the first and second parts of the cease-fire resolution. Lozano agrees.

Nehru feels his way forward and suggests again that the Plebiscite Administrator could expect only that much assistance from the Kashmir Government as he needed to organise the plebiscite machinery and to ensure its impartiality. He could not, in other words, function as the omnipotent dictator, the super Prime Minister, super Commander-in-Chief, and super Chief Magistrate that the original Security Council resolution (April 21, 1948) wanted him to be. Lozano agrees!

Nehru insists that in the “freedom of propaganda” which the Plebiscite Administrator would demand for the protagonists of Pakistan, there could be no room for whipping up of religious fanaticism, for raising the cry of “Islam in danger”. Dr. Lozano agrees again, and, caught in Nehru’s hypnotic spell, enthusiastically goes a step further: “Such activity”, he asserts, “could not be considered legitimate” and “the same test would apply to freedom of Press and speech.” (*Aide Memoire* of Nehru-Lozano talks, *Indian News Chronicle*, January 14, 1949.)

Nehru now boldly attacks the vexed problem of “Azad Forces”:

“Pakistan had raised about 25 battalions of 28,000 to 30,000 men who now form the Azad Kashmir Forces and the presence of such a large number of armed people would not be conducive to the security of the inhabitants in rebel-occupied territory.”

These forces, he triumphantly demands, must not only be disbanded but, first of all, disarmed.

By this time Lozano and his American Adviser, Colban, are completely crushed. They nod their heads submissively in hurried assent.

“In view of this explanation, Dr. Lozano agreed that there should be large-scale disarming of Azad Forces, not merely disbanding.” (*Aide Memoire of talks, Indian News Chronicle, January 14, 1949.*)

Nehru strides triumphantly across the room, while our crest-fallen American diplomats pick up their papers hastily and beat an embarrassed retreat! Nehru's victory is sweeping and complete. And woe-betide him who dares to suggest otherwise. Woe-betide the sceptic who dares to suggest that the fairy-tale of these ready “agreements” sounds too good to be true. Only a cynical and unbelieving Communist would deny that Nehru has beaten these foreign diplomats to a pulp, and assert that the Indian Government has been fooled!

Within eight days of this pathetic farce, on Jan. 1, 1949, the cease-fire was announced.

In the meantime a grimmer and more ominous drama was being enacted in the Commission's negotiations with Pakistan.

At the same time as the Government of India, and on exactly the same lines, the Pakistan Government also sought clarifications, and made reservations on precisely the same controversial issues, the “Northern territories” and the “Azad Forces.”

Just a day before India informs the Commission of its interpretation of para (b) of the cease-fire resolution, Zafarullah, on August 19, 1948, writes to the Commission seeking confirmation of what the Commission has given him to understand on identically the same point:

“In para A (3) the Commission proposes that pending a final solution the territory at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government will be administered by that Government.” (*Cease-fire correspondence, Hindustan Times, Sept. 7, 1948.*)

The very next day, as we have seen, India writes to the Commission giving a diametrically opposite interpretation of the resolution, and informs the Commission of its intentions of re-establishing its own administration in a part of these disputed territories. The Commission does not inform India of the understanding it has given to Pakistan, but gives India the impression that this matter is to be raised "in the implementation of the resolution."

Barely two weeks after this, on Sept. 3, 1948, Zafarullah raises the same question again and reiterates his Government's stand. He pointedly defines the "evacuated territory", the administration of which, according to the cease-fire resolution, will be through "local officers under the surveillance of the Commission", as those territories "in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which were at the time of evacuation under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command."

These territories, he emphasises further, must be administered by the "authorities in *de facto* control" of them, must be administered, in other words, by the Pakistan Government. (*Vide* Dr. Chyle's report to the Security Council, Dec. 1949.)

At the same time, and in the same letters, the Pakistan Government makes known its reservations in respect to the "Azad Kashmir Forces", clearly stipulating that they must remain intact.

The Commission does not inform the Pakistan Government even at this stage that it has received reservations from the Government of India, and that it has already given assurances on these points. Nor is the Government of India informed of what the Commission is doing on the other side. The Commission quietly proceeds to give diametrically opposite assurances to the Pakistan Government. The obvious result of this deep-laid and sinister plot is to harden both Governments in the positions they have taken, positions which are not only contrary and mutually exclusive, but totally irreconcilable.

Zafarullah, unfortunately, is somewhat slow in catching on the fascinating plot, and tactlessly asks for a written confirmation of the assurances given.

"Since your letter of Sept. 3", he writes to the Commission, "does not contain the precise and full record of the clarifications and elucidations of proposals furnished by the Commission in the course of discussions in our meetings of August 31 and Sept. 2, may I venture to enquire whether the Government of Paki-

stan, in drawing up the statement of their views on the Commission's resolutions, have or have not been justified in relying upon the clarifications, elucidations and assurances orally furnished by the Commission in the course of their discussions." (Cease-fire correspondence, *Hindustan Times*, Sept. 7, 1948.)

Written confirmation indeed! What is this fellow up to? Can't he use his brains? What does he think this is, an ordinary village-store transaction in which ledgers are filled in and accounts kept? Tut, tut, my man, how old-fashioned you are! Back home in America we don't believe in such petty details. In our country, where gigantic business enterprises hold the fate of millions in giant hands, where the Almighty Dollar reigns supreme and whole nations are bought and sold, we use better methods than these. We use sharp wits, the gangster's smash-and-grab tactics, and a master-conjurer's skill. We can use any weapon we like, but the main thing is, don't give any damned thing in writing. Don't leave any traces behind.

And the Commission maintains a discreet—and dignified—silence.

But this gem of worldly wisdom is lost on Zafarullah. He looks at the Commission again in dull uncomprehension and repeats his embarrassing demand. Worse, he goes a step further. He writes to the Commission stating that the Pakistan Government is prepared to accept the cease-fire proposal, but subject to a few conditions, the main being that the elucidations and clarifications given to Pakistan are signified as being acceptable to India; and, conversely, the clarifications and assurances given to India are accepted by Pakistan.

Get the consent of each to the assurances given to the other! You mean we inform India of the assurances we've given to Pakistan and inform Pakistan of the promises we've given to India? Have you ever heard of such a thing? Why man, it's against all the rules, it is against our holiest principles! You can't succeed in business like this. We really thought you are on our side. But you're worse than Nehru. He was quite happy to accept any promises we set before him. But you..... you..... you must be raving mad!

Loud and bitterly must the Commission have lamented with the Indian proverb about the "*Dana dushman*" and the "*Bewaqoof dost*."*

And on Sept. 6, 1948, the Commission announced in a huff that the conditions stipulated by Pakistan being unac-

* "A wise enemy is better than a foolish friend".

ceptable, "immediate effectuation of its cease-fire proposal of August 13 is not to be envisaged." In simpler language, the cease-fire talks had broken down.

The New York *Herald-Tribune*, better posted, perhaps, with "inside" information than either of the two Governments here, immediately forecast that it was "even doubtful whether further good offices would be made." (Sept. 8, 1948.)

At the same time, the Commission patted the Government of India graciously on the back, and the Chairman sent a letter appreciating "the spirit in which the decision (to accept cease-fire unconditionally) is taken." (*Hindustan Times*, Sept. 7, 1948.)

Meanwhile, on Zafarullah the light of understanding suddenly dawned. He now understood that, which, much to the Commission's discomfiture, he had earlier failed to grasp: that there was more in the Commission's reticence than the eye could see. In a spirit of rare and commendable sportsmanship he quickly fell in line, "to play the game in the spirit of the game." And when the cease-fire proposals were taken up again, in the following months at the Paris session of the Security Council and the General Assembly, not once did he repeat his questions about "written confirmations." And not for one full year, until Sept. 1949, did he so much as breathe about the assurances and promises that the Commission had so obligingly given him.

When the cease-fire resolution was brought up for discussion again at the Paris session of the Security Council, Bajpai, sublimely innocent of the sinister traps that had been quietly laid, began with loud and fulsome professions of unshakable faith:

"We still have the fullest faith in the United Nations and we are desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement with Pakistan". (*Hindustan Times*, Nov. 27, 1948.)

I see no evil; I hear no evil; I speak no evil!

Hardly had he proceeded further than Zafarullah rose to confront him: Then why don't you accept an immediate cessation of fighting?

Taken aback, Bajpai fumbled for a reply: "But we have always been for an immediate cessation of fighting, it is you who refused to agree."

Who, I? Why, of course not. I only suggested a few minor amendments. If you could accept them.

"I will agree here and now. I am ready for, and have always been ready for a cease-fire without any

conditions. The truce proposals demand the withdrawal of Pakistan forces. To this Pakistan has no objection." (*Hindustan Times*, Nov. 27, 1948.)

Blissfully unaware still of all the secret understandings and assurances that had gone to produce this dramatic and startling change, the Indian spokesman found that he had nothing further to say. A clear and simple proposal had been made by Zafarullah in full view of the world. Weighed down as his Government already was, with constant anxiety to "uphold the prestige of the United Nations", could he even dream of refusing?

The Anglo-American diplomats, who had been waiting and watching intently, pounced upon this glorious chance and, amidst a shower of congratulations and acclamations, dragged India and Pakistan again into the secret conference room. A few brief meetings, a few hurried discussions, the farce of the Nehru-Lozano meeting on Dec. 20, which we have already mentioned, in which Nehru raises point after point and Lozano, gushing with generosity, agrees — and before the bewildered people of Kashmir, who have been carefully excluded from discussions of their fate, can even ask what is happening, the deed is done.

Zafarullah magnanimously waives aside his earlier objections and conditions, and on Jan. 1, 1949, amidst wild rejoicings in the Anglo-American camp, the cease-fire is announced.

The prestige of the United Nations has been saved. And the Indian Government, too, can join in the rejoicings, while the rejoicings are good.

Meanwhile, Kashmir watches the ominous developments plunged in silent thought. Why, the people begin to ask themselves, are the Anglo-Americans so anxious to hustle India and Pakistan into a hasty cease-fire? The answer had already been guessed some months earlier by sections of the Indian Press.

"Political quarters here believe that any cease-fire order at this stage would mean the recognition of the existing military dispositions, and thereby pave the way for the partition of Kashmir." (*Indian Nation*, Patna, Aug. 12, 1948.)

The *People's Age* nailed down the imperialist motives sharply:

"Even a cursory study of the Press summary of the interim report of the UNO Commission and its *communiqué* on the plebiscite is sufficient to show that

what has been loudly claimed as a great victory of the United Nations is only the culmination of the nefarious intrigues of the British and American imperialists against the democratic mass movement of Kashmir and Jammu.

"The policy that was being pursued by them till now through the instigation of war and intervention in Kashmir and Jammu with the help of Pakistan reactionaries, mainly the annihilation of the democratic mass movement in Kashmir and Jammu and the enslavement of their people, and the setting up on their soil of Anglo-American war-bases directed against the Socialist Soviet Union and the democratic forces in China, would now be attempted to be carried forward to completion through 'peaceful' means and under cover of the 'free and impartial' plebiscite that will now be held under the direction of the military and political agents of American imperialism, masked as the UNO Commission officers....

"Their aim is to foster and consolidate reaction during the holding of the plebiscite and to create a situation of friction and conflict inside the State, so that, whatever the outcome of the plebiscite, partition of the State becomes inevitable and is carried through in accordance with the plan already prepared by the Anglo-American imperialists." (*People's Age*, Jan. 16, 1949.)

And as the ominous answer began to dawn on its people, Kashmir tried again, slowly and with difficulty, to stir itself. Held in check by the Indian Government ever since July 1948, when Nehru and Baldev Singh flew to Srinagar to call off and scatter the growing movement of anger and protest, paralysed since then by the helpless inactivity of its own leaders, Kashmir tried to move again. Reports like the following began to appear occasionally in the Indian Press.

"The talks of a possible move to partition Kashmir have evoked the strongest possible resentment throughout the Jammu and Kashmir State. Reports of meetings and processions condemning any such move are being daily received here." (*Hindustan Times*, Sept. 12, 1948.)

But the resentment of which the Indian papers now spoke was no longer of that deep and volcanic intensity which threatened a few months ago to shake the Anglo-American plans to their very foundations. Then, the National

Conference rose proudly on the crest of an angry wave and called for armed struggle to fight imperialist intervention. Now it was just a few gestures of mild protest. A few occasional speeches, a feeble tremor which passed through an isolated section and gradually died out.

The Indian Government's intervention "to uphold the prestige of the United Nations", just in the nick of time, just as the storm was gathering to burst, had had its lasting effect.

The Indian Government itself was busy trying to clarify its foreign policy to the satisfaction of the Anglo-Americans. Throughout the six months that the Commission was engaged in the nefarious task of laying a trap for India and Kashmir, reactionary circles in India were equally engaged in the task of tying India's foreign policy evermore closely to the imperialist warmonger's camp. Every blow that the Commission struck at Kashmir's freedom and integrity was utilised by these reactionary circles to whisper the advice of dishonour and shame.

In their view, the Anglo-Americans were not striking India in the face because they wanted Kashmir for themselves, but only because they were displeased with India because of her own "barren policy", of her "attempted neutrality." Pakistan had won Anglo-Americans' support simply because it had lined up unhesitatingly behind them. And if only India would consent to walk into the Anglo-American parlour and submit quietly to their will, it could earn the masters' favours again.

In Sept. 1948, it was learnt that Nehru was to leave shortly to attend a conference of Commonwealth Premiers in London. The Congress Party in the Constituent Assembly met to discuss his foreign policy and the question of India quitting the Commonwealth, to which the Congress was pledged throughout the last twenty years. On the eve of the meeting an obviously inspired message was circulated to the Indian Press from New Delhi.

"India must frame her foreign policy in a manner as to maintain the present cordial relationship with the countries of the world, particularly Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries..... The possibility of Pakistan continuing as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations may weigh to a great extent in making a decision on this issue."

A month later, as Nehru was embarking for London, Birla's *Eastern Economist* came out again to openly lay down the line for him. India must not quit the Common-

wealth, it insisted. Membership of the Commonwealth would give India all the pretty things that she so badly longed for. It would—

“... give us a bulwark against Communism; it would bring us within the range of Commonwealth defence ... It would give us what we sorely need, friends in the United Nations.”

And all these numerous advantages, the benign protection of the Anglo-Americans, for no price at all! — for doing just that which Birla and his kind were only too anxious to do... joining in the holy crusade against the Godless Communists.

Already on August 15, Sardar Patel, the “iron man”, had warned of the dangers which lay in store for India with the impending rout of Chiang Kai-shek in China and the collapse of the French and British gangster regimes in Viet-Nam and Malaya, and had threatened to put down similar subversive elements in India with a “firm hand”, lest India go the China way.

“The price that is asked is that we should shed our hesitancy in taking sides on the international front, and go in without reservations against the USSR... It will mean—let this be frankly stated — that India will go in with a power-bloc.” (*Eastern Economist*, Oct. 22, 1948.)

With Nehru’s return to India in Nov. 1948, it became known that, notwithstanding his profuse and repeated denials, India had agreed at the London Conference to throw overboard its old and time-honoured pledge to quit the British Commonwealth.

And just at the time when the farce of the Lozano-Nehru talks was being staged, just in those critical days when India was signifying its acceptance of the imperialist-sponsored cease-fire, which would “pave the way for the partition of Kashmir” and seal Kashmir’s doom, the Eastern Economist came forward to triumphantly announce India’s final line-up behind the imperialists, and proceeded to rub in the real meaning of this line-up openly, without hesitation or shame:

“In practice—whatever political quibbling may say —our foreign policy has now been given a definite orientation. It is towards the foreign policy which will keep us primarily on friendly terms with the Commonwealth.... Association with the Commonwealth which is more friendly to the USA than to the USSR implies

that we are in effect leaning towards the USA. The logical consequence of this political fact should be clear. *We cannot in the United Nations or elsewhere take a line except on a minor issue which is contrary to that taken by the Commonwealth and the USA. (Dec. 31, 1948—italics ours.)*

The forcible seizure of Kashmir by the Anglo-Americans, for partition, for the overthrow of its national government, for the suppression of its freedom, was certainly no "minor issue". On this issue, therefore, the Almighty Birla could not take a line "contrary to that taken by the Commonwealth and the U.S.A." India's Big Business having thus voiced its frank opinion, the Indian Government could have nothing further to say. At the most it could stand by and wring its hands helplessly, a pathetic and helpless witness of the ghastly tragedy that was staring Kashmir in the face.

VI

Groundwork for Partition

FOR the Anglo-Americans, the announcement of a cease-fire marked a decisive stage in the unfolding of their ultimate plan. And the manner in which it had been brought about was quite in the highest traditions of imperialist diplomacy, a singular achievement of which they could, indeed, be justifiably proud.

Time and again, their newspapers, the *London Economist*, the *London Times*, and the *Manchester Guardian*, had inadvertently given away the real objective they had in mind. And only recently, at the Paris session of the UN General Assembly, speculation had been rife over some secret proposals "envisaging the eventual vivisection of the State through a regional plebiscite or otherwise." (*Hindustan Standard*, Dec. 9, 1948.)

But the astute diplomats who had taken Kashmir's fate in their hands, knew that the time to announce their final plans was not yet. The decision to partition Kashmir could be announced only when the groundwork had been fully laid, only when, through patient and persistent work, those objective conditions were created in which partition could emerge logically, naturally, almost spontaneously, amidst the universal acknowledgement, that it was, after all, "the only real solution."

In this, the announcement of the cease-fire was, of course, a big step forward. And the success with which they had encouraged both the Governments in their opposite and contradictory stands, the success with which they had strengthened the belief of both that their respective viewpoints were exactly in accordance with the real opinions of the Commission, was a bigger achievement still.

But a lot more had to be done. Their first need now was to leave the two Governments for some time to fight it out amongst themselves. The next step would be to demonstrate to the world that, left to themselves, neither of the two Governments was prepared to yield a single point and that, consequently, no "peaceful" solution was possible. After that they would be able to prove that a continuation of the dispute was a constant incitement to war between the two countries. At the same time, they calculated, both the disputing parties would begin to be tired out in the sterile quarrel. Both would begin to feel that its continuation was a strain on their own internal political and economic situation, both would begin to look eagerly to the Anglo-Americans for some solution of the expensive dispute.

And when, as a result of these mischievous manoeuvres, the people of Kashmir would be finally divided and confused; when their attention would be successfully diverted from the internal struggle for democratic reforms to the artificially-inflated slogan of accession to India or Pakistan; when Kashmir's powerful national movement — the only force likely to thwart imperialism's carefully laid plans — would break down under the strain, then would be the time for the Anglo-Americans to come in all their triumph and glory, amidst a fanfare of trumpets, the standard-bearers of "peace between the sister Dominions"! Then would be the time to announce, like Solomon, their wise judgement: "Let India and Pakistan be given roughly equal portions of the State. Whatever remains, the Valley or Gilgit or Skardu, we'll take unto ourselves."

And, if all their calculations turned out right perhaps the tactics might prove still more fruitful. Perhaps the need to deliver the judgement even might not arise. Perhaps India—and Kashmir itself!—might one day come running to them, begging for partition of their own free will. Already Nehru had come to the stage of suggesting to Dr. Lozano and Ambassador Colban, in the discussions on Dec. 20 and 22, that "the Commission should not limit its proposals to a plebiscite, but other methods should also be explored."

And the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* had suggested wishfully:

“Circumstances may force India and Pakistan to devise any other feasible means of ascertaining the will of the people, or *find out any other solution of the Kashmir embroglio.* (Feb. 21, 1949 — italics ours.)

The scheme was beginning to work. It was near producing the desired results. A little more patience, a few more months to let India and Kashmir stew in their own juice— and soon enough they would come before the Commission in a chastened and sobered mood. And when India itself began to ask for partition, not a speck of blame would attach to the Anglo-Americans for doing just what the disputant parties asked them to do! What a master-stroke of policy that would be! What brilliant ingenuity! What a classic example of diplomatic skill, so breath-taking in its simplicity, so profound in worldly wisdom!

Inspired by the brilliant successes achieved thus far, fascinated by the magnificent possibilities opening out before it, the Commission got down to work again. On Jan. 5, 1949, the Commission passed another resolution outlining the principles for a truce and plebiscite, and providing for the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. According to the Commission's resolution:

“All civil and military authorities within the State, and the principal political elements of the State, will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for and the holding of the plebiscite.”

A few days later the Commission announced exultantly that both the Governments had accepted the principles of the truce-and-plebiscite resolution, and proceeded promptly to press both the Governments for its implementation.

And the mischief began. India notified the Commission of its willingness to begin withdrawing its forces, but demanded first, on the basis of the assurances given, the disarmament and disbandment of the Azad Kashmir Forces and the handing over to the Kashmir Government of the strategically situated “Northern” areas.

Immediately the foreign Press began to splash news from the Commission's headquarters, prominently giving the Pakistan point of view. Even papers from Malaya and Australia joined in the chorus:

“Zafarullah has told the Commission that Pakistan considers that the areas now occupied by Pakistan and

'Azad Kashmir Forces' should be administered by the 'Azad Government' and not by Sheikh Abdullah's Government." (*Singapore States Times*, Feb. 10, 1949.)

"The Pakistan Government in its statement on the negotiations for a settlement of the Kashmir issue... said that the areas of Kashmir at present occupied by forces under the overall control of the Pakistan High Command would remain occupied by Azad Kashmir Forces." (*Melbourne Age*, Jan. 18, 1949.)

Both the Governments were firm on their stand. Both the Governments refused to budge. And as the deadlock grew worse, and signs of impatience began to be shown, the Commission came forward as the peace-maker again: Is it the Azad Kashmir areas and Forces that you are quarrelling about?— they asked both the Governments with an air of assumed innocence. But why all this unnecessary heat? We have still to study those areas and then we will tell you what is to be done.

On March 12, the Commission announced that it had set up a sub-committee to study the administrative machinery and problems of the Azad Kashmir territory. India's viewpoint, it will be remembered, was that since in the Northern areas there was no regular Pakistan administration functioning and no regular organised body of troops fighting, she had every right and every intention to move in her garrisons and re-establish the administration, and that the Commission was bound, even after the cease-fire, to ensure the Indian Government freedom towards this end.

Simultaneously, the Pakistan Press reported that a "split" had occurred between the two "Azad" leaders, Sardar Ibrahim and Ch. Ghulam Abbas. S. Ibrahim's "Cabinet" had resigned and the more reliable Pakistan agent, Abbas, had officially taken over.

At roughly the same time, it was reported that Pakistan had moved its forces into the Northern areas, and had taken over the administration of Gilgit, Skardu and Baltistan. A few weeks later, while discussions for a settlement of the truce line were still going on, the *Statesman* reported that Pakistan troops had infiltrated into the Gurez sector and Lubrigen Valley north-east of Keran.

The significance and timeliness of these moves was lost on no one. Pakistan had moved in. A *fait accompli* was presented to the Commission's sub-committee. And all that the Commission needed to do now was to express its heart-felt sympathy with India and plead its helplessness in the matter.

As the Czechoslovak member of the UNCIP, Dr. Chyle, was to inform the world later—

“The situation in the Northern areas had, meanwhile, undergone a material change in that the Pakistan armyconquered many strategically important places during the interval. . . .The Commission is bound to admit that while the reservation of the Government of India of August 20, 1948 (with regard to the Northern areas— *Author*) may be legally valid, it is physically impossible to implement it.” (Dr. Chyle’s minority report to the Security Council, Dec. 19, 1949.)

And if the astonished Government of India sought to remind the Commission politely that it had long ago communicated its intention to re-establish the Jammu and Kashmir Government administration in these areas, and that the Commission in its letter dated August 25, 1948 had given a clear-cut assurance that the matter would come up “in the implementation of the resolution”, the Commission had only to assume an air of injured innocence and protest: Assurance? What assurance? You seem to have misunderstood us completely. All that you said was that there wasn’t any regular Pakistan administration in these areas and no regular troops fighting. And all that we said was that we would study the situation in these areas later. And we have studied it now, haven’t we? We have sent our sub-committee there.

“This *obligation* of the Commission,” as Dr. Chyle called it plainly, “the Commission now **explains** as only a declaration of an intention to study later the situation in the North. (*Ibid.*)

And what was the result of the Commission’s “study”? A foregone conclusion.

“The Truce Sub-Committee,” reported the *Manchester Guardian* while these discussions were still under way, “which recently visited Western Kashmir is believed to have reported that it found a well-established administration in being in this area, so that there is small prospect for enforcing the *nominal suzerainty* of the Jammu and Kashmir State over this area.” (April 9, 1949—italics ours.)

So that’s that. And there is no use wasting your time over it. And the Commission proceeded rather bluntly to demand that India withdraw her forces, and to be quick about it.

India demurred and pressed the Commission to first

secure the disarmament and disbandment of the "Azad Kashmir Forces."

By this time, Dr. Chyle tells us:

"The Azad Forces grew by the spring of 1949 into 32 disciplined and fully armed battalions, which, according to an evaluation by the Military Adviser to the Commission, represent a 'formidable force.' Owing to this fact, which is at variance with Part I, Section B of the said resolution (cease-fire resolution, August 13, 1948— *Author*) forbidding both parties from increasing their military potential, the situation has undergone a material and absolute change." (Dr. Chyle's report, Dec. 1949.)

But the Commission closed its eyes discreetly to the "material and absolute change" which was taking place on the other side of the cease-fire line. The Commission was in no mood to be bothered about such minor details as a violation of agreement by Pakistan. And rightly. If you become too petty and punctilious about such minor details, too much of stickler for propriety and good faith, you only encourage the other side in such inconvenient virtues. And if India, for instance, were to become equally insistent that the Commission implement the very letter of the large-hearted assurances it had given, the entire neatly laid plot would come to a sudden and sorry end.

So the Commission merely hummed and hawed, and tried, as gracefully as it could, to wriggle out of its contradictory assurances.

The Commission plunged into a bewildering whirl of meetings, discussions and negotiations. From Srinagar to Delhi, from Delhi to Karachi, and from Karachi back again. And after a great deal of strenuous labour, on April 15 it produced "fresh proposals", aiming, as the foreign Press reported, at "adjusting the conflicting viewpoints within the framework of the August 13, 1948 resolution, and consistent with the spirit of commitments already entered into."

India again pointed out politely that the fresh proposals contained nothing fresh in them and that they were not consistent with the commitments already given.

But the Commission was quick to notice that, in spite of its apparent obduracy, the Government of India was already beginning to give way under the strain. Finding it difficult to stand up to Anglo-American pressure, the Government of India had already begun to water down its stand.

"A certain amount of flexibility," the *Indian News Chronicle's* special correspondent explained in an obviously inspired report,

"may not be considered unreasonable with regard to the time when the process of such disarming and disbandment should begin.... But the principle of disarming and disbandment must be accepted by Pakistan." (April 20, 1949.)

The significance of this softening was not lost on the Commission. Past experience had shown that every time India, or for that matter Kashmir, was seen to stiffen its back menacingly, it was best to beat a hasty retreat, and to *pat India graciously on the head. But as soon as India showed signs of yielding, that was the time to wield the heavy stick and hit with all your might. And now that the cease-fire had already been enforced, now that India was already caught helplessly in the tentacles of its pro-imperialist foreign policy, now that Kashmir's national movement was already beginning to founder on the rocks through which its leaders had failed to steer it—now was the time to exert some extra pressure and bring both India and Kashmir finally to their knees.*

Where bluff had produced such brilliant results so far, the bully's bluster and blackmail was bound to succeed.

Within a week of the Press reports that the Government of India was willing to be more "reasonable" over the issue of the Azad Forces, the Commission pretended to indicate its impatience with this long-drawn-out and futile discussion. It would not have its time wasted by India's "ifs" and "buts". On April 28 it informed the Indian Government, brusquely and without much ceremony, that it was presenting its "final terms" for the withdrawal of the Indian army. "Further discussions", the *Statesman* reported, "are not considered necessary" (April 28, 1949).

The Commission had asked for "unreserved acceptance" of the terms. Both the Governments were given just one week to make up their mind and deliver their replies. And if either of the Governments failed to comply with these "final terms", the Commission would report directly to the Security Council — and then God help you when the Big Bosses, Warren Austin and Noel Baker, hear of your impudence and cheek!

But much to the Commission's astonishment the bullying did not work. A Government of India spokesman announced on May 3 that India could not accept the "final terms", as they were at total variance with the undertaking

the Commission had previously given. The imperialist Press promptly seized upon this statement as yet another example of India's notorious intransigence. Under a prominent headline, "India Set To Reject UN Plan On Kashmir", the *New York Times* reported:

"The spokesman said the Commission wanted India to start pulling her troops out of Kashmir without waiting for a decision on the withdrawal and disbandment of 32 battalions on the Pakistan side." (May 3, 1949.)

The Government of India daring to refuse! The Government of India rejecting the Commission's "final terms", announced with such a fanfare of publicity and backed up with the Commission's direst threats! Could the Commission believe its eyes?

But this was more than astonishing. This was most embarrassing. What could the Commission do now? Could they go and report to the Security Council, as they had loudly threatened to do? But how could they explain in a *public* report the somewhat tricky business of the profuse assurances given to India, which, much to the Commission's discomfiture, the Indian Government seemed to have taken seriously? And how could they prevent India from speaking up plainly in the open Security Council debate and giving away the whole sordid story of assurances which the Commission was trying so assiduously to break? A public debate is a most embarrassing thing, particularly when you have a secret skeleton in your cupboard which you must, for sometime at least, hide. The secret conference room is the only place where such inconvenient matters can be straightened out.

The Commission decided to swallow its earlier thunder, and announced meekly that it would not report to the Security Council, that it would patiently pursue further negotiations, "to fill the gap between the points of view of India and Pakistan." To fill the gap, in plainer words, between the assurances given to India and the diametrically opposite assurances given to Pakistan.

But by now the suspicions of the Indian people were beginning to be aroused. Already on April 6, H. V. Kamath, M.P., had asked in the Indian Parliament, whether it was a fact that the disbandment of the Azad Kashmir Government and the Azad Forces was a part of the cease-fire agreements. Nehru, with the air of a school-master rebuking an errant child for having poked his nose into a matter which was none of his business, replied:

"The Hon'ble member is getting mixed up between cease-fire and other things. So far as the cease-fire is concerned it was a pure and simple cease-fire. But, of course, behind that cease-fire were other developments, i.e., certain resolutions passed by the Security Council and the UNCIP.... As far as the liquidation of the Azad Kashmir Government is concerned, this question did not arise, because we have never acknowledged the existence of any such thing."

Mr. Kamath: "What is the position of Pakistan troops in Azad Kashmir territory?"

Pt. Nehru: "It is a simple fact which is very clearly stated in the resolution". (*Indian News Chronicle*, April 7, 1949.)

The verbose reply conveyed nothing on the point all India was eager to know, viz., was it a fact that the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir Forces was a part of the understanding specifically arrived at between the Indian Government and the Commission prior to the cease-fire? And was it a fact that having secured India's consent to the cease-fire this understanding was now being broken?

With Nehru's vague and non-committal answer the people remained, as before, in the dark. But with each successive move, they had begun to form their own conclusions:

"Observers believe," wrote the *Indian News Chronicle*, "that some of the assurances given to India's Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Commission (Dr. Lozano) on matters such as withdrawal, disarming and disbandment of Pakistan forces and the strength of Pakistan and Indian forces to be kept in Kashmir, have been materially changed." (May 19, 1949.)

As yet it was only an isolated suspicion of breach of faith, based on the limited knowledge of only one of the disputant parties, and that, too, in a hesitant and unsure whisper. That itself, the Commission realised, was bad enough. But suppose the Government of India also decided to speak up bluntly and plainly. And what would happen if Zafarullah took it into his head to blurt out the story of the assurances of which he had last year demanded "written confirmations", and of which he had till then whispered not a word!

The very thought was too frightening to entertain. And the Commission quickened its desperate efforts to straighten the mess of lies and false promises, before the laboriously

erected edifice of double-dealing came crashing around its ears.

Dr. Lozano's name, the Commission noticed, was being mentioned far too frequently in the Indian Press. Dr. Lozano was being remembered as the man who, along with the American diplomat Colban, had given Nehru his profuse and unlimited assurances. Dr. Lozano it was who, with Colban again, had conducted the more decisive of the negotiations with Pakistan, soon after Pakistan had tactlessly asked for a written confirmation of some assurances given to it.

On June 10, Dr. Lozano is asked by the Commission to meet both the Governments to "discuss" their stand. This mess was of his own making — let him go and straighten it himself! A gang of coffin-thieves seldom holds together when their luck is running out.

Dr. Lozano proceeds first to Delhi to meet the Indian Government. The Indian Press begins to remonstrate that so long as his famous *Aide Memoire* stands, and so long as he is there on the Commission to vouchsafe for the authenticity of the *Aide Memoire*, how can the Commission change its stand?

On June 22, 1949, Dr. Lozano comes to Karachi to meet the Pakistan Government.

On June 24, 1949, Dr. Lozano resigns.

Simple enough. No Dr. Lozano on the Commission, no one you can hold responsible for the scrap of paper given to you. Another master-stroke of diplomacy! Another superb achievement of consummate skill! What a treasure-house of genius posterity will discover in our Kashmir Commission's work!

VII

The Real Face

FLUSHED with victory, their confidence in their own adroitness revived, the Commission decided to tackle the Indian Government's much-publicised intransigence with vigour and boldness again. But bereft of the Columbian delegate Lozano's nimble wit, the Commission was left now to the American delegate Macatee's resources of diplomatic skill.

A typical Americanised diplomacy this, a crude and heavy-footed diplomacy, a wooden and unimaginative diplo-

macy, a diplomacy lacking all the subtleties and refinement of Macatee's Latin-American colleague, but as sure and deadly, and as uncompromising in its determination to stand "no damn nonsense", as a Chicago gangster's bullet.

Yet it possessed an undoubted virtue. It avoided the terrifying pitfalls which prior to Dr. Lozano's resignation appeared to threaten the entire Commission with doom. The American diplomat realised with a charming modesty that if, by an accidental oversight, he happened to put his foot into the trap he had painstakingly laid for others, he did not possess the necessary nimbleness or mental agility to wriggle out with the ease of his graceful Latin-American colleague.

So the rough-and-ready diplomacy, the safe American diplomacy of accosting your victim armed with a bag of dollars in one hand and a heavy club in the other.

Under the American's influence the Commission reverted to the tried and trusted method of showing up both the Governments as equally unwilling to arrive at an agreement, thereby making it incumbent on the "peace-makers" to intervene and give a decision on their own. A report was issued from Lake Success that both the Governments had refused to accept the Commission's "compromise proposals". At the same time, revealed Dr. Chyle:

"The American Press brought the news, said to be emanating from Lake Success, that the Commission would take the road of arbitration. This news was published a day ahead of the date when the US delegate placed before the Commission his first arbitration proposal.... The US delegate strove to bring the Commission round to the idea of solving the question of truce through arbitration.... With the quite frankly avowed intention to bring Admiral Chester Nimitz at the earliest possible moment to the sub-continent in the capacity of the arbiter." (Dr. Chyle's report, Dec. 1949.)

Admiral Nimitz had, some months ago, been already appointed as the Plebiscite Administrator, notwithstanding the fact that no agreement on the terms of the plebiscite had been reached, and that, bit by bit, the Anglo-American Powers had begun to reveal that their ultimate objective lay not in a plebiscite but in partition.

Admiral Nimitz's hurried appointment, however, fitted into America's global war strategy, the details of which were only then unfolding. By this time, the bellicose war-mongering of the Truman Doctrine had been revealed, the

Marshall Plan had begun its operations, and the North Atlantic Pact had been hastily pulled into shape.

By this time also, following India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth, innumerable war-plans for Eastern Asia and the Pacific, on the pattern of the Western European alliances, were being made. A spate of conferences and negotiations had been held. Various feelers had been put out. Military conferences in Singapore, political conferences like the Asian Conference on Indonesia in Delhi, special Cabinet Envoy's missions in Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon; the Eden tour on behalf of the Conservative Party to Australia, Malaya and Singapore; the urgent propositions of Premier Chiefley of Australia for a Pacific Pact; Chiang Kai-shek's moves to build an "anti-Communist bloc" with the American puppets of South Korea and the Philippines, the Dominion Premiers' Emergency Conference in April 1949—indeed a rapid succession of moves had been made to drag India and other Asian nations into the Anglo-American plans for war.

Commenting on the real purpose of the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference in London, in April 1949, the *Daily Telegraph* wrote:

"The real objects of the Conference will be to integrate all Commonwealth countries into the system of Western defence and devise some sort of co-operation for resisting the spread of Communism in Asia. Active measures considered will be primarily economic and directed against Communism's political offensive, but the military aspects of the situation will not be overlooked. What is contemplated is a kind of Indian Ocean Pact to complement the Atlantic Pact in the historic task of 'containing Russia'." (March 14, 1949.)

Thus, with Nimitz's appointment as Plebiscite Administrator in Kashmir, enjoying all the vast and unlimited powers that the Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948 sought to bestow on him, America would succeed in installing its three outstanding war-time military experts in the three most strategic "trouble-spots" in the world—General MacArthur to "soften up" and exterminate the Far East, General Eisenhower to hold the fort in Europe, and Admiral Nimitz to wield the whiphand over both India and Pakistan.

"Since May 1948," says Dr. Chyle in his report, "there appeared in the American Press frequent notices of the shortly expected arrival of Admiral Nimitz on the sub-continent."

But American hopes of an early taking over by Nimitz of his strategic post in India were being belied. India's exasperating obstinacy in holding on to the assurances given to her, and the consequent difficulties in agreeing upon the Commission's plebiscite plans was delaying the arrival of the Admiral. American patience was coming to an end when Macatee had his little idea: If Nimitz can't come immediately as the Plebiscite Administrator, why not bring him in with still wider powers, as the Supreme Arbitrator.

But now another difficulty arose. The Czechoslovak delegate put his foot down. The Commission was not authorised by its terms of reference to propose arbitration, he insisted. The proposal itself was illegal. The Commission was "morally and legally bound to invite both the Governments to a joint political meeting before considering any other means or solutions," Dr. Chyle said.

The suggestion for a direct discussion between the two Governments was not such as to find favour with the other four members of the Commission, intent, as they were, on diligently spreading the belief that both the Governments were completely and absolutely unreasonable, and that foreign intervention was the only way out.

A joint meeting of the military staffs of the two Governments was, at the time, already being held in Karachi with a view to settle a permanent truce line. The majority of the Commission members scoffed at the idea of a "joint political meeting", and, convinced that the joint military conference already in session would also result in an inevitable failure, they countered Dr. Chyle's insistence with the offer that they would agree to a joint political conference, provided the current military conference succeeded. Dr. Chyle protested against this move to make the high-level political conference dependent on the military conference, the results of which were as yet unknown. But he had to give in to the majority decision.

A few days later, much to the chagrin of the American satellites on the Commission, the Indo-Pakistan military conference ended in a complete agreement.

"The pessimistic attitude of the Commission," reported Dr. Chyle, "towards any negotiations for an agreement on the fixing of a truce line of demarcation was shown to be entirely unjustified."

And on July 29, 1949, at Dr. Chyle's insistence, a proposal to invite both the Governments to a high-level ministerial conference to discuss all outstanding issues was passed. The American delegate, however, abstained from

voting in its favour. He still persisted in deriding the proposed conference, and, insisting that it was bound to fail, that it was only a futile waste of the Commission's time, again put forward his proposal for arbitration.

On the same day, and in the same meeting in which the proposal for direct discussions between the two Governments was passed, the three delegates who had voted for the Czech proposal voted dutifully for the diametrically opposite American proposal also!

Both the Governments enthusiastically welcomed the Czech proposal for a joint conference at ministerial level, and preparations were begun. A date was fixed, the venue decided upon, the names of the leaders and members of the delegations announced, and discussions on the agenda almost complete, when suddenly, to everyone's astonishment, just four days before it was scheduled to begin, the Commission announced that it had cancelled the conference.

Both the Governments protested against the cancellation. Both the Governments, according to Dr. Chyle, "expressed disappointment and astonishment." But the Commission had suddenly remembered again that direct negotiations between the disputant parties were futile, and that the conference would not, could not — actually should not! — succeed.

Immediately the American Press published "forecasts", emanating as usual from Lake Success, that the Commission would now proceed to suggest arbitration. And immediately the American proposal for arbitration, which had already been passed by the Commission and which was kept, ostensibly a dead secret, ready at hand, waiting for an opportune moment, was brought forward again.

And then occurred two significant incidents which threw a flood of light on the manner and method in which the Commission, and its parent body, the UNO, functioned.

At Dr. Chyle's insistence that the unauthorised leakages from the UN Headquarters of news of the Commission's secret proposals were a gross interference with the Commission's independence and integrity, the Commission sent a telegram protesting against the leakages and demanding an investigation into them. The telegram was addressed personally to the Security Council Chairman. The Chairman for the month happened to be the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik. Dr. Chyle revealed later in his report that an American member of the UN Secretarial staff, Cordel by name, received the telegram, opened it, and reading its contents, decided to quietly suppress it!

Not until the next month, when the British delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan, assumed the presidentship of the Security Council, did the much-too-independent-minded junior employee choose to deliver the telegram. And what did Alexander Cadogan do? Reprimand Mr. Cordel, American or no American, for daring to encroach on the rights and privileges of the highest dignitary of the Security Council, the Chairman himself? No, indeed. Rather, he sent back a telegram, "rejecting" the Commission's complaint and reproaching the Commission for having dared to protest.

The reason behind Cadogan's apparent pusillanimity was soon revealed. At the time of this incident the British and American Governments were themselves directly involved in a gross and open violation of the Commission's independence and integrity. It was known that a few weeks earlier, at the time that the American member of the Commission, Macatee, was trying to push forward his arbitration proposal in face of Dr. Chyle's strong opposition, Bevin had convened a hurried conference with the British High Commissioners to India and Pakistan and the British Ambassador to America.

"Political observers were reported to have interpreted the conference as reflecting the growing concern of Britain and the United States over the twenty-month-old Kashmir dispute." (*Indian News Chronicle*, July 23, 1949.)

And now, just as the above significant incident was being enacted in the Security Council, Macatee was again busy transmitting the Commission's secret proposals to, and receiving instructions on how to proceed from his Government.

"The secret arbitration offer of the Commission was, before being presented to the Governments of India and Pakistan, placed at the disposal of the Governments of USA and the UK.... The verbatim text of the secret arbitration memorandum came into the hands of the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi at the same time, or even sooner than it was officially presented to the Indian Government." (Dr. Chyle's report, Dec. 1949.)

President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, as is well known, made use of this secret information surreptitiously conveyed to them, to bring "public interventionary pressure" to bear on the Indian Government to accept the arbitration proposal.

“The intervention by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee,” said Dr. Chyle, “was made possible on the basis of precise and timely information emanating from the Commission itself.”

The Commission, however, in public utterances baldly denied that it had anything to do with this intervention, and persisted in its glib denials. Dr. Chyle demanded an investigation. It was refused. The Indian people had begun to draw their own conclusions:

“It is generally believed in Srinagar that the Commission’s proposals (re. arbitration) were sponsored by the US delegate, Mr. Robert Macatee, and that he communicated it to his Government.” (*Hindustan Times*, Sept. 3, 1949.)

But more rude shocks were in store for the Commission. In spite of the minute care with which the background of the arbitration proposal had been prepared; in spite of the timeliness with which the big guns of Britain and America had been drawn up to concentrate fire on the Indian Government and bring it to its knees; in spite of all the tremendous pressure brought to bear on it, openly by Truman and Attlee, and secretly through the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi; in spite of the temptations that America held out to India, of “lasting and eternal friendship”, and honey-sweet invitations to Nehru to visit America in a triumphal tour; in spite of the treacherous advice to surrender, volunteered by Birla’s reactionary scribes;* in spite of the most careful concentration by the Commission of all its tactics and weapons into one final and decisive knock-out blow, the Government of India refused to yield. The last and final blow had misfired. Instead, it acted on the Commission like a boomerang.

Within a week of Truman and Attlee’s dramatic public intervention, the Commission was called upon by a suspicious public to explain the reasons which had led it to cancel direct negotiations between the two Governments just on the eve of the meeting. The Commission was forced to publish its correspondence on the subject with India and Pakistan.

In publishing Zafarullah’s letters to it, the Commission threw a bombshell. *For the first time in the last fifteen*

* “The ways of negotiations, mediation and conciliation under the auspices of the Kashmir Commission having failed to produce results, it would be quite entirely in keeping with the obligations under the Charter to try arbitration.” (*Hindustan Times*, Sept. 3, 1949.)

months, the stunned and stupefied people of Kashmir learnt of the clear and detailed assurances given to Pakistan, secret assurances which gave the lie direct to every promise the Commission had in those very days given to India!

“In para 2 (C) of its letter dated Sept. 18, 1948,” wrote Zafarullah, quoting chapter and verse, “the Commission gave a *categorical assurance* to the Pakistan Government that the resolution of August 13 does not *contemplate the disarmament or disbanding* of Azad Kashmir Forces.”

“According to these documents,” he continues, (B-2 of Part II of Commission’s resolution of August 13, 1948, read with the Commission’s letter of Sept. 3, 1948, and para IV (D) of the Commission’s letter of April 23, 1949) “the evacuated territory will be administered by local authorities, and no official of either the Government of India, or the Maharaja’s Government will be permitted to enter the evacuated territory.” (*Indian News Chronicle*, Sept. 8, 1949.)

And this is followed by details of meetings and discussions with Lozano himself.

“While explaining Clause 4 of the Commission’s proposals of Dec. 11, 1948, relating to the plebiscite stage, Dr. Lozano is reported to have told the Prime Minister of India on Dec. 20, 1948, that it was the Commission’s intention that there should be large-scale disarming and disbanding of Azad Kashmir Forces. Dr. Lozano assured me on Dec. 25, 1948 (!) that the disarming and disbanding of Azad Kashmir Forces would take place only at the plebiscite stage and along with the final disposal of the Indian and *Kashmir State Forces*. He added that the exact scope of this reduction of the forces on both sides will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the authorities concerned. . . . This was reaffirmed by Dr. Lozano and yourself on Feb. 8, 1949, when you agreed that it was *not the Commission’s intention* that Azad Kashmir Forces should be disarmed during the truce period.” (Zafarullah’s letter to Commission’s Chairman, August 16, 1949.)

The effect of these startling revelations on the people of Kashmir can better be imagined than described. Shocked and furious, Kashmir was as if unable to believe its eyes. Could such downright duplicity be really possible? Could responsible and respectable members of an international

commission really resort to such cheap and disgusting trickery, the tricks of petty card-sharpers and thieves? And all this behind the high-sounding phrases of "peace", "justice" and "impartiality", behind the sanctimonious cover of the United Nations' lofty ideals and prestige! Was this the reality of the Security Council? Was this the manner in which it implemented the principle of "peace amongst nations" and the noble provisions of the United Nations Charter? *Could Kashmir believe its eyes? Just three days after a solemn assurance is given to one Prime Minister, a contradictory and diametrically opposite assurance is given to the other Government secretly, stealthily, without qualms of conscience or trace of shame! Two sovereign and self-respecting Governments are cheated outrageously! An entire sub-continent is scandalously duped!*

But how would the people of India now react? Could they possibly take this calculated insult to their Prime Minister, this unbelievable outrage on their national honour, lying down? Would they not come out with a straightforward and full-throated denunciation of the Commission's dishonourable role? Would they not boldly tear the mask of "neutrality" and "impartiality" from the Commission's face, and proceed, at this stage at least, to rescue Kashmir from the Commission and from Anglo-American hands?

Even the *Manchester Guardian* had found it impossible to ignore this startling exposure of the Commission's role.

"The Kashmir Commission," it wrote, "during their negotiations tried to do all things to all men." (Reported in *Hindustan Times*, Sept. 8, 1949.)

Dr. Chyle had noted the disastrous blow the Commission had dealt to its own prestige, and remarked in his report:

"The Commission did not succeed in winning public confidence on either side and, on the contrary, left the sub-continent charged..... with pusillanimity and even with double dealing."

But the reaction of the Indian Press was tragically docile, lifeless and meek. A few papers, like the *Indian News Chronicle*, made polite and indirect, almost half-hearted, references to the Commission's contradictory assurances:

"The Commission after a full and detailed consideration of India's case, and a first-hand study..... has entered into commitments with India, and the Government of India on the strength of those commitments accepted the cease-fire... If the contention is that the

Commission has given to Pakistan certain other assurances on these points, India cannot, in fairness, be expected to atone for the Commission's self-contradictions or errors." (*Indian News Chronicle*, Sept. 8, 1949.)

Some, like the *Tribune*, spoke up a few months later, but venting their anger and bitterness mainly on Pakistan, not daring to nail down the Commission as the real villain-of-the-piece, attempting almost to absolve it of the widespread suspicion of guilt.

"The Commission in effect built up the screen of cease-fire, behind which Pakistan raised and equipped 32 battalions of the Azad Kashmir Forces, and militarily seized important strategic positions in the Northern areas. . . . The UN Commission has ill-served the cause of peace in the State of Jammu and Kashmir by proclaiming itself a helpless, we hope not a willing, witness of the fraud which has been perpetrated under its very nose." (*Tribune*, Dec. 31, 1949.)

But the *Hindustan Times*, terrified lest even these faint and indirect expressions of suspicion may annoy the Anglo-American masters, scrupulously avoided any mention of the Commission's scandalous duplicity, and rushed forward with effusive and sickening protestations of eternal faithfulness and loyalty. Just a day after Zafarullah disclosed the detailed assurances Dr. Lozano had given him, the *Hindustan Times* wrote:

"There is a general recognition of the friendly motives of President Truman and Mr. Attlee in addressing personal appeals to Pt. Nehru to help bring the Kashmir dispute to an early end. . . . The fact that President Truman is taking a keen personal interest in the forthcoming visit to the USA of Pt. Nehru and is planning to send his own plane to the United Kingdom for India's Prime Minister, shows the respect in which Pt. Nehru is held in the USA." (Sept. 8, 1949.)

A few days later, as the Commission packed up and slunk away in confusion, Nehru packed up and flew off to be toasted, feted and lionised as America's "hope" in Asia, during his triumphal tour in the "Discovery of America". Much to Kashmir's speechless amazement, the Indian Government had decided to take the outrage committed by the Commission, meekly, lying down.

Kashmir, which had watched the new developments shocked, indignant and with tense expectation, was plunged again in silence and gloom.

VIII

A Valiant General to the Rescue

THE Anglo-American Powers did not fail to note the Indian Government's helpless and total dependence on them. Nor did the Commission fail to take advantage of it.

After lying low patiently in Lake Success for three months, allowing the latest repercussions and memories of its performances in India to quietly die down, in Dec. 1949 the Commission gathered its forces again for another assault. Four members of the Commission, America and her three loyal satellites, Belgium, Columbia and Argentina, submitted a report to the Security Council on their findings and recommendations.

Confident that neither India nor Pakistan would dare to challenge the picture that they gave or the claims they made, the four members of the Commission proceeded to extol their own efforts at disinterested mediation, and laid the blame for their failure squarely on the obstinacy and intransigence of both the Governments.

The report mentioned the questions of the Azad Kashmir Forces, the withdrawal of armed forces, and the defence and administration of the Northern areas as the three questions on which their mediation efforts had broken down. *The report quietly bypassed the rather inconvenient question of the contradictory promises and assurances given to both the Governments, and proceeded to make its recommendations.*

On the question of withdrawal of forces and demilitarisation it recommended that the problem be "treated as a whole," "eliminating all distinctions and comprising all questions concerning the final disposal of *all* armed forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

In simpler language, the report recommended that the original Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948, which *had* made some sort of a distinction between the aggressor forces and the defending armies; which had, therefore, called upon the Pakistan Government to withdraw the tribal raiders and Pakistan nationals *completely*, and had provided for the retention of a portion of the Indian army; which had also not questioned the right of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, as a sovereign Government, to raise and maintain its own armed forces and militia; which, in spite of this apparent concession to India, had been opposed violently by the Kashmir National Conference, and which India too had, ostensibly at least, refused to accept, was now to be

overthrown. It was to be replaced by a provision "eliminating" all such distinctions made. It was to be replaced by measures seeking the final disposal of all armed forces in Kashmir, including also the militia of the Kashmir Government.

On the question of the Northern areas also the report recommended a complete reversal of the position accepted by the Security Council formerly. The 1948 resolution had recognised the sovereignty of the Kashmir Government over all its territories, and hence had called for the complete withdrawal of Pakistan nationals and tribal raiders. The 1948 resolution had not recognised any such thing as the "Azad Kashmir Government" or its armed forces, or administration. Obviously, therefore, with the withdrawal of tribal raiders and Pakistan regulars, the entire territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State, and particularly the Northern areas, were presumed to revert to the Kashmir Government.

But the report now stated bluntly that this was just not possible. Any entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. Therefore, the highly strategic areas in the North must remain under the administration of the Pakistan Government, "subject (of course!) to the supervision of the United Nations."

A few weeks later, while India was still attempting to utter a few polite protests, the British delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan, drew pointed attention to this new proposal.

"In regard to the question of the Northern areas my Government is impressed by the view given in para 273 of the Commission's report that the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. It is the duty of the Security Council to eliminate such a possibility. It will be remembered that all members of the Commission except one (Czechoslovakia) felt that the Government of India ought, in these circumstances, to be willing to waive this claim, which has in any event to be considered afresh"!

Behind the polite request to "waive this claim" the warning to India was clear: Abide by our decision; hand over the strategic areas to us, or we will expose you as the one who is provoking a "renewal of hostilities"; we will brand you as the aggressor!

In its final recommendations the Commission showed that it had learnt some valuable lessons from the experi-

ence of the last few months. *The presence of just one member on the Commission from Czechoslovakia, a country outside the ring of America's satellites, had upset many a neatly laid Anglo-American scheme, and had given many a cause for heart-burning and regret. The Czech delegate, Dr. Chyle, had boldly exposed the imperialist conspiracies aimed at widening the differences between the two Governments, preventing direct negotiations between them, and seeking an excuse to foist their top-ranking military expert, Nimitz, on Kashmir as an arbitrator. He had fought to maintain the independence and integrity of the Commission against American attempts to turn it into a convenient tool of US State Department policy.*

But for Dr. Chyle's embarrassing presence on the Commission the gang of thieves could have proceeded merrily and undisturbed on their business. *The immediate need, therefore, was to eliminate this disturbing element, and to ensure that in future the "mediation" machinery would be more reliable, more pliable and more amenable to Anglo-American will.*

The report, therefore, recommended that the five-nation Commission be wound up, and in its place a single mediator — a "sincere individual", as the report piously called him— be appointed, not by the Security Council, but by the UN Secretary-General. And the terms of reference of this sincere individual be so worked out as to specifically include the power to "settle eventually by arbitration" those issues which may remain outstanding and which impede the "creation of conditions for the holding of a plebiscite."

The four members' report thus sought to present a ready solution for every hurdle the Commission had come across in their attempts to overthrow Kashmir's national government and to seize Kashmir for Anglo-American domination. On the two vital questions of the Azad Kashmir Forces and the Northern areas the recommendations were a total negation of the assurances given to India, assurances on the basis of which the cease-fire had been brought about. In their total effect, the recommendations were an open recognition of the status of equality between India and Pakistan, a position which, the Anglo-Americans well understood, must be achieved if the Kashmir dispute was to be kept alive, and partition—"the only real solution"—was to succeed. In brief, the recommendations, if anything, were worse and more obnoxious and humiliating to Kashmir and India than the original 1948 resolution of the Security Council which India had refused to accept.

The Czechoslovak delegate, however, refused to associate himself with these unjust and amazing recommendations. In a separate minority report he refuted the Commission's contention that its mediation efforts had failed because of the intransigence of the Indian and Pakistan Governments.

"The failure of the Commission's mission is not", he declared, "solely ascribable to the intransigence of the Governments of India and Pakistan..... The reason must also be looked for in the activities of the Commission."

And one by one he exposed the entire activities of the Commission. The false promises the Commission had given to both the Governments; the duplicity because of which the Commission failed to win confidence on either side; the secret instructions the Commission received regarding the thrusting of Admiral Nimitz, at the very earliest, as an arbitrator with wide and unlimited powers; the sudden and astonishing cancellation of the joint political meeting between the two Governments, the one and only chance the Governments were getting for a direct discussion of the dispute; the general discouragement of all negotiations between the parties, to prove to the outside world that a direct settlement was impossible, that a continuation of the impasse was a dangerous threat to world peace. In fact, Dr. Chyle tore the mask off the hypocritical pretensions of the Commission and laid bare the actual activities by which, posing as peace-makers, it had fanned the flames.

In his positive recommendations, Dr. Chyle drew pointed attention to the actual facts of the situation.

"The Commission deeply underrated the significance of the Azad Forces and failed altogether to take into account the situation in the Northern areas, on which two problems subsequently all the Commission's work kept on floundering."

He pointed out that the Pakistan Government, by increasing the strength of the Azad Forces subsequent to its acceptance of the cease-fire and by "conquering many strategically important places during the interval", had violated the provisions of the cease-fire resolution. The resolution itself "entirely omitted to concern itself with the situation in the strategically very important territory of North Kashmir."

"The resolution of August 13, 1948, due to its many serious shortcomings, cannot in its present form remain the basic legal instrument of new mediation efforts.... From this failure, it has to be concluded that the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and of January 5, 1949.... are out of keeping with the actual present-day situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and that no compromise acceptable to both Governments can be reached on their basis."

As regards further efforts at mediation, he stressed:

"If a peaceful solution of the dispute is to be attained, it has to be ensured that the Commission does not become an instrument of policies of certain Great Powers.... the new mediation organ must be really independent and untrammelled by outside interference."

And this, Dr. Chyle insisted, could be guaranteed only by a Commission consisting of the representatives of all the members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, the only Big Power which from the very beginning of the Kashmir dispute had exposed Britain's hidden hand behind the tribal invasion and recognised Sheikh Abdullah as the leader of Kashmir's democratic people.

Two reports were now before the Security Council, both proceeding on entirely different lines. The one based its case on a clever evasion of the facts at issue; the other sought to restore the basic facts to their proper perspective and spoke up sharply against the one-sided proposals which controverted these facts. The one was a sinister attempt to widen the antagonism between the two disputant Governments; the other demanded that the new mediation efforts should really bridge the gulf successfully and for this purpose, the new Commission should maintain its integrity and impartiality. The one was the culmination of the two-year-old intrigues against Kashmir, and contained every provision that they could think of to ensure the success of their designs; the other recognised the sovereignty of Kashmir's national government, and sought to prevent—at a time when India's compromising leaders were themselves unable to prevent—Kashmir's subversion to foreign domination.

It would appear only natural that the Nehru Government, claiming, as it did, that it had rushed to Kashmir's aid to prevent its being overrun by force of arms, would wel-

come the Czechoslovak report whole-heartedly and, in its own national interest, would cling firmly to its recommendations. That was the only way in which India could extricate itself from the knots into which the imperialist Powers had tied up the Kashmir dispute.

But not so the Indian Government. By this time, so complete was the mess into which its servile pro-imperialist foreign policy had landed it, so deep the morass of surrender into which it had sunk, that it could not bring itself to accept the help its own nominee on the Commission was offering it. It could not take a simple step to defend the freedom of the Kashmiri people and the honour of the Indian nation.

The Indian Press published the Chyle Report, and commented on it, but briefly, almost hesitantly:

“The UNCIP resolutions (of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949) cannot be of practical help in settling the Kashmir issue, and it is good that Dr. Chyle’s report has underlined this point.” (*Hindustan Times*, December 28, 1949.)

The Chyle Report is a good thing, but...but the concrete reality of dependence on the Anglo-Americans is hard and stern. And any help offered by “the other side”, however timely and urgently needed it may be, must be waved away sadly. And when the Anglo-Americans insist on foisting proposals based only on their own report, casting the other report unceremoniously into the waste-paper basket, India, bound hand and foot by her own servile foreign policy, must submit with stoic resignation.

It is significant that not once in their various speeches and statements did the Government of India’s representatives dare to mention the Chyle Report. The conspiracy of silence which killed his recommendations was the disastrous climax to the successive surrenders which India was being forced to make as a logical consequence of her pro-imperialist foreign policy. For India and Kashmir, it meant virtual suicide.

On December 7, 1949, the Security Council, having conveniently forgotten the Chyle Report, brought up the four members’ report for discussion. Once again the old farce of “behind-the-scene” talks and “friendly” negotiations was resumed, on lines with which we are already familiar. The old pattern of the 1948 debates was witnessed again — the initial refusals and determined rejections, the uncompromising speeches and the heated debates, the hectic “high-level” activity in Delhi and the call to struggle and preparations

for armed resistance in Kashmir. Soon this was followed by the old and well-known tactics — the threats, the pressure, a few verbal modifications, a few bland assurances — and then India docilely surrendered!

General MacNoughton, the Chairman of the Security Council for the month, undertook the delicate responsibility of conducting the “friendly” negotiations and of quietly hammering the parties into submission.

After the usual whirl of hurried meetings, as the expiry of General MacNoughton’s term of chairmanship and membership of the Security Council drew near, he announced the proposals that he had put before the Indian and Pakistan delegates. The proposals were based almost entirely on the recommendations of the Commission’s majority report, asking for the “elimination of all distinctions” in the question of withdrawal of armed forces.

To achieve this “elimination of distinctions”, General MacNoughton proposed: First, that there should be a “progressive *reduction* of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line. . . . in such stages as not to cause fear to the people on either side of the cease-fire line.”

Second, that the armed personnel should be reduced to a “minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order.”

And third, that demilitarisation should include the withdrawal of regular forces of Pakistan and the withdrawal of such forces of India as are not required for purposes of security or for maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line; also reduction by disarming and disbanding of local forces, including, on the one side, the armed forces and militia of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, on the other side, the “Azad Forces.”

In his commendable search for a firm equalitarianism, for “eliminating” all invidious “distinctions” between the parties, the worthy General had hit upon a noble principle. Hold the scales fairly and evenly between the two. After all, high and low, all are equal in the eyes of God!

That one of the parties was the victim and had brought up a complaint against aggression and had demanded a straight answer to its complaint; and that the other was the aggressor, or the tool of the aggressor — this was only a minor and irrelevant detail. The General was not the man to lose himself in such petty hair-splitting and quibbling, and was in no mood to be bothered about tiresome stories of the past. The actual facts of the Kashmir invasion might baffle many a lesser diplomat. And the knowledge that the

entire world was acquainted with these facts might force them to many a patient and prolonged manoeuvre and many a secret intrigue. But the General was made of bolder stuff. When he came across a Gordian knot, he knew from his textbooks on the History of Military Campaigns how to cut it, with the bold unsophistication of his eminent predecessor, Alexander.

Truly, the General was just the man to show the way out of the mess into which the Kashmir Commission had got.

"I have intentionally avoided", he declared with traditional military candour, "attempting to analyse or pronounce unnecessary judgement on the rights and wrongs of disputed issues of the past. Certainly it seems to me the most hopeful course to follow, because this method of approach does not require us to choose between conflicting interpretations of past history." (*Hindustan Times*, Dec. 30, 1949.)

On the question of the Northern areas, the General was equally free of doubt. They would be included in the general programme of reduction of forces outlined above, but their administration must be continued by the existing local authorities, subject, of course, to UN supervision.

General MacNoughton outlined his proposals on the role and functions of the new mediator also. The Czechoslovak proposal for setting up a wide and powerful Commission, including the Soviet Union, was taboo. Indeed, the much dreaded Czechoslovak representative, with his embarrassing disclosures, was himself to be removed from the Commission, and for this, the drastic step of winding up the whole Commission was to be undertaken. In its place, one UN representative, "a sincere individual" who could be depended upon not to give the whole show away, was to be appointed by the Secretary-General. In his appointment the Security Council, unlike 1948, was to have no say. The "interpretations" of this representative on the agreements reached between the parties on the points of the MacNoughton proposals were to be final and binding on both the Governments. And as soon as he certified that the withdrawal of forces had been accomplished "to his satisfaction" the Plebiscite Administrator, Admiral Nimitz, would take over, under powers assigned to him by the four members' report.

In the above proposals, the General had only faithfully echoed the recommendations of the Commission. It was, however, in his final rider to the proposal on the functions of the mediator that he took a decisive, though carefully camouflaged and harmless looking, step towards the "ulti-

mate plan", partition "through a regional plebiscite or otherwise" — the plan which the Anglo-American diplomats had in their minds ever since January 1948, but which they had been careful not to divulge until the conditions for its willing acceptance were found to be fully ripe. The UN Representative was not bound to adhere to the plan for an overall plebiscite. He was authorised to "make any suggestions to both the Governments which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to an expeditious and enduring solution of the Kashmir question."

Needless to say, the proposals met with the enthusiastic support of the entire Anglo-American bloc. The Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, alone rose to utter a word of warning against this attempt to thrust the Anglo-American decisions down India's and Pakistan's throats. Any attempt by the majority of the Security Council to impose their own decision on India and Pakistan without taking the views of the two parties as "of prime importance" would, he said, only put the Security Council in an "embarrassing position." He insisted that "the views of both parties should be considered of primary and not, as was then the position, of secondary importance." (Hindustan Times, Dec. 31, 1949.)

He opposed the proposal that the appointment of the new mediator be left to the Secretary-General, and that Admiral Nimitz be allowed to function under powers assigned to him in the Commission's majority report, insisting that both these responsibilities lay with the Security Council.

IX

Enter, The Wolf In Sheep's Clothing

BY early January, 1950, it became known that General MacNoughton's behind-the-scene attempts to bludgeon both parties to agree to his proposals were not going too well. Pakistan had accepted the proposals with "minor amendments" which, as Zafarullah hastened to explain, did not alter the principles, but India, not daring to adopt the attitude of outright rejection, had signified its polite dissent through a series of "major amendments."

But the reaction of Kashmir to the obnoxious provisions of the MacNoughton proposals was sharp and unequivocal, leaving no one in any doubt. Ever since June 1948, when the Indian Government had intervened to call off the National Conference programme of widespread preparation

for struggle against the Security Council intervention, Kashmir had watched the various imperialist intrigues to seal its fate, and the various Indian Government surrenders before the imperialist pressure, in growing helplessness and dismay. Confused and disorganised since then by the compromising policies of the Indian Government, Kashmir now decided to speak up again.

A whirlwind campaign of mass meetings and demonstrations to protest against the MacNoughton proposals was chalked out. Kisan workers' schools were organised to take the slogan of land reforms to the rural masses. The call was given for a united front of all anti-imperialist elements by no less a person than Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Deputy Prime Minister, himself. Fighting speeches, denouncing the MacNoughton proposals, were made.

Speaking at Palanwala in Jammu, Bakshi Sahib warned that if, coerced by threats and pressure by the Anglo-American Powers, the Security Council accepted the MacNoughton formula without caring for the "rights and wrongs" of the issues involved, the people of Jammu and Kashmir would resist it with all their might.

"Our faith in the United Nations has been shaken," he declared. "The British ruling classes which were responsible for the division of India and the estrangement of relations between Hindus and Muslims, have again come out in their true colours. So long as a single Kashmiri is alive the MacNoughton formula will not be accepted." (*Hindustan Times*, Feb. 29, 1950.)

Mirza Afzal Beg, the Revenue Minister, gave an outspoken warning to India's compromising leaders:

"India will lose the friendship of Kashmir if she were to bow down before the pressure of the Anglo-American bloc and accept, *in any shape or form*, the MacNoughton formula which equated the aggressor and the aggressed.... The pressure that is being brought to bear on India clearly showed that Kashmir was being treated as a pawn in the game of power politics." (*Tribune*, March 2, 1950.)

The *Tribune*, headlining another fighting speech by Bakshi Sahib, "Kashmir's Deputy Prime Minister Castigates Anglo-American Bloc", reported:

"The last nail in the coffin of the false prestige of the Insecurity Council will be driven by the people of Kashmir," angrily declared Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed,

addressing a mammoth meeting of Jammu citizens.... Bakshi Sahib was vividly enraged at the Anglo-American tactics. "The Anglo-American bloc wanted to thrust its decision upon India by applying pressure and threatening sanctions against her", he said." (*Tribune*, March 4, 1950.)

Four days later, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, in bitter indignation, exposed the precise form of the pressure and the sanctions the imperialist Powers were threatening to use against India.

"The Anglo-American Powers have threatened India with stopping petrol and many other commodities she is getting from them', was disclosed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, addressing a meeting on March 7. 'The Anglo-American bloc wanted to bind its decision on India by threats and coercion'." (*Indian News Chronicle*, March 8, 1950.)

The resentment of Kashmir's leaders against the latest Security Council proposals was great and deep. But equally great was the determination of the Anglo-Americans to push forward their proposals, and to push them through soon.

By this time, the Soviet delegate had boycotted the Security Council in protest against the refusal to admit a representative of People's China. This, the Anglo-American majority realised, after their unhappy experience of the exposures made by Czechoslovakia, was precisely the time to hurry through with their plans, particularly before a representative of People's China came in.

"The Powers backing the four-Power proposal", reported a *Reuter* correspondent from New York, "appear to be keen on getting the resolution passed before more Communist members of the Security Council come in." (*Tribune*, March 14, 1950.)

Faced with such a situation, for the Anglo-Americans the next step was clear. The former tactics of patient and prolonged intrigue had already served their purpose. Now that India and Kashmir were already in a hopeless quandary, and, in the context of their basic policies, could see no way out of it, the time was fully ripe to come forward with a sharp and sudden blow. Already, the *London Economist* had indicated the "get-tough" attitude of fire and thunder, which the situation called for.

"The Security Council should either insist on the difficulties which are holding up progress towards the

plebiscite being referred to arbitration—whether India likes it or not—or should go straight to the root of the matter and insist on the armed forces of both sides being removed and replaced by an *international police force*.” (Quoted in *Tribune*, Feb. 28, 1950.)

The “get-tough” policy, the imperialists realised, must this time be more terrifying, and the weapons used to break Kashmir’s resistance and bring India to her senses must be more effective than ever before. If a repetition of the threat they had given during the 1948 session of the Security Council, the threat to cut off India’s supply of petrol, did not succeed in this, as it had succeeded previously, other means would have to be found.

And other means were found. Just a day after Sir Alexander Cadogan had threatened India that if it insisted on bringing its troops into the strategic Northern areas, fighting would inevitably flare up again, the British Press set up the cry of an imminent danger of war between India and Pakistan.

The Delhi correspondent of the *New Statesman and Nation* set the tune, which other British papers were only too ready to take up:

“Pakistan officials of the highest standing talk openly of fighting for what the United Nations does not grant them.” (Dec. 30, 1949.)

And a few days later, with a remarkable and astonishing coincidence, communal riots did actually break out in East and West Bengal. Soon enough, with the dangerous situation created, suddenly and unexpectedly, for both the Governments, both were accusing each other heatedly of “hostile acts and intentions”, both were ordering their armies to stand by, ready for any emergency, both were talking openly of a “defensive war.”

The British Government was only too quick to express its keen interest in and “concern over” the critical situation arising between India and Pakistan. The Indian Press reported in early March that Mr. Attlee was likely to call both Nehru and Liaqat Ali to London to “discuss” the situation in East and West Bengal, and the British High Commissioners in both the Dominions were seen to have got unusually busy.

At the same time, as the war danger was mounting on the Indian sub-continent, another move to get India’s acceptance to the Security Council proposals was made. The astute Anglo-American diplomats realised that the very

name, "the MacNoughton formula", had acquired too much notoriety in public speeches and in the Press. Both the Indian and Kashmir leaders had, in spite of General MacNoughton's timely warning in December 1949, made too many public commitments in its opposition, commitments from which, as the General had foreseen, they would find it "difficult to resile."

A show was, therefore, made of dropping the MacNoughton formula, and in its place another resolution, sponsored by America, Britain and their ostensibly "neutral" satellites, Norway and Cuba, was brought up.

This four-Power resolution was nothing but an abridged version of the MacNoughton formula, the only addition in it being a brief sentence providing that the demilitarisation was to be "without prejudice to the rights and claims" of both India and Pakistan. Against the background of General MacNoughton's earlier declaration that the "rights and wrongs" of past issues were entirely irrelevant, this sentence meant just nothing.

Zafarullah in accepting this four-Power resolution made it plain repeatedly that it was based on the MacNoughton proposals. And Sir Terence Shone, the British delegate, according to a *Hindustan Times* editorial, in elucidating the resolution on behalf of the four sponsors, "made it plain that... the intention is to follow broadly the lines indicated by General MacNoughton," and that the Security Council "recommended these suggestions (MacNoughton's proposals) in general terms to the parties, and to the UN Representative." (*Hindustan Times*, March 17, 1950.)

But however obnoxious and dangerous the contents of this new resolution, however closely patterned it obviously was on the MacNoughton proposals, in the Anglo-American calculations the big achievement was that the much-publicised name of the "MacNoughton formula" had been changed. After all, "what's in a name?" — when the four-Power resolution could just as well give them Kashmir for the asking.

The much-boasted dropping of the MacNoughton formula was a cheap and crude trick, so obvious in its crudeness that it could fool no one but those anxious and willing to be fooled.

But by this time, India was willing to be fooled. The accumulation of a three-fold pressure, the Anglo-American threat to cut off her petrol, the use of the traditional weapon of communal riots in both the Bengals, and the whipping up through known imperialist agents of mass frenzy for a total war, was more than India could stand.

The Indian delegate, B. N. Rau, naively asked for "clarifications" on some points of the resolution. And through the four clarifications which the British delegate, Sir Terence Shone, promptly furnished, India was tactfully offered a badly needed "face-saving" device, patchy and unconvincing, yet useful enough for India to retreat while keeping up a show of dignity and prestige.

The first clarification was on the vital question of the withdrawal of forces, the crucial question on which Kashmir had reacted so violently and bitterly, and around which the entire plan of the Anglo-Americans to bring in Pakistan troops, or to get an opportunity of bringing in their own troops, was hinged. On this vital question, the clarifications refused to budge one inch from the MacNoughton proposals. On this crucial question, therefore, the Indian delegate, B. N. Rau, knowing that given the basic policies of the Government, he could do no better, also decided to close his eyes.

The second clarification was with regard to the Northern areas. If the UN Representative found that the Anglo-Americans had been wrong in assuming that the bringing in of Indian troops into these areas would lead to a resumption of hostilities, "the resolution would not preclude him from suggesting other appropriate arrangements." This obvious mockery was seriously characterised in an editorial in the *Hindustan Times* as "an important gain." (March 17, 1950.)

The third clarification was that the UN Representative would have powers to interpret agreements reached in the future, not in the past. This insulting piece of tomfoolery the *Hindustan Times* editorial accepted solemnly as a "more important gain."

The fourth and last clarification was that the UN Representative would have the freedom to suggest any solution at variance with the "agreed objective", i.e., an overall plebiscite. This most sinister proposal, which could signify nothing but partition, which was obviously the beginning of the final imperialist plan, and which at this stage was nothing new, having been suggested first in the MacNoughton plan itself, was welcomed joyously by the *Hindustan Times* editorial as "the most important gain."

Reading this editorial, the Anglo-American strategists would have every reason to be pleased with their success. India, as they had fondly hoped two years ago, was herself beginning to ask for the solution which their Press had so often publicised, but which they themselves had not yet dared openly to mention. India was herself walking into the trap they had laid with so much patience and care.

And the *Hindustan Times* editors, as soon as they heard of the British "clarifications", promptly got down, panting and perspiring, to an intricate arithmetical adding up—one, two, three, four: out of the four clarifications given one seems to go against us, but three go solidly and decisively in our favour. Hurrah for the clarifications! Hurrah for Sir Terence Shone! The British have swung decisively to our side. The resolution is all that we could possibly want. What a brilliant victory for us! Hurrah for the policy of hitching our wagon loyally to the Anglo-Americans! And hurrah for the scribes of Birla, who have always believed faithfully that one day their foreign masters would reward them for this loyalty, in spite of the long and humiliating history of initial curses and kicks.

That the one clarification which seemed against them was just the most vital point, that it was precisely on this point that Kashmir's leaders were up in arms, and that Mirza Afzal Beg had uttered a solemn warning to India against any compromise—this did not matter. Everything would now be all right, the *Hindustan Times* firmly believed. If only the U.N. Representative could be wooed to be sweet to us.

"To a very great extent, the success or otherwise of the present attempt to solve the Kashmir problem will depend on the ability, personality and character of the representative finally chosen for the task." (*Hindustan Times*, March 17, 1950.)

The national organ of the Indian big bourgeoisie having laid down the line, it was easy to see how the Indian delegate at Lake Success would act. He announced grandiloquently, with solemn dignity, that India was firm in its total opposition to the MacNoughton proposals. The Indian Government had completely and finally rejected them, and could never be brought to reconsider this outright rejection. But this four-Power resolution, this—believe it or not—was a different thing. This resolution India would accept and gladly.

"Considering the almost hopeless position from which we started", B. N. Rau told *Reuter-PTI* correspondent in Lake Success, after he had accepted the resolution, "we have reason to be pleased with the outcome." (March 15, 1950.)

In a desperate attempt to delude the gullible and to calm the indignation of those outraged people who had been fed assiduously, for months, on thunderous speeches that

India would never accept the humiliation of the MacNoughton proposals, who had been led to believe that India had, at last, taken up a "public position" from which it would never "resile", B. N. Rau, like the *Hindustan Times*, tried to feed them on further empty illusions. Arriving in Bombay from Lake Success on a brief visit, he told reporters:

"There appeared to be a marked change in the trend of opinion in the United Nations over the Kashmir issue. Many of the nations were coming to realise the force of the stand taken by India, and there was greater appreciation today of her case." (*Hindustan Times*, March 30, 1950.)

So ridiculous was the position that India was taking in her sudden somersaults that Zafarullah could only laugh in her face:

"Bharat said this resolution is based on the MacNoughton proposals. We have rejected the MacNoughton proposals. Subject to our rejection of the MacNoughton proposals, we accept this resolution." [*Laughter.*] (Speech in Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, August 27, 1950.)

But, while Zafarullah could enjoy the situation, Kashmir's leaders were in no mood to laugh. Sitting again amidst the ruins of a movement which was called off just as suddenly as had been set in motion, they were left to their own wits, to explain India's latest surrender, as best as they could, to a stunned and bewildered people. And those leaders of Kashmir, who had uttered a stern warning that India would lose Kashmir's friendship if it accepted the MacNoughton proposals "in any shape or form," were left to themselves to silently eat their own words.

And with as astonishing a coincidence as before, now that India was beginning to "talk sense", the war tension between India and Pakistan began to die down. The British High Commissioners to both the Dominions interviewed Nehru and Liaquat Ali and persuaded them to settle all their differences amicably, adopting the well-known Nehru-Liaquat Pact.

Meanwhile, the search for the UN Mediator to be appointed under the four-Power resolution was begun. The appointment, though nominally by the Secretary-General, was really a prerogative of the Americans. *Reuter's* Lake Success correspondent reported:

"When Sir Zafarullah Khan was asked who would probably be the Mediator, he led his questioner to a

US delegate, and said: 'Ask him, he knows more than I do.'" (*Indian News Chronicle*, March 3, 1950.)

Already, before India had signified its acceptance of the four-Power resolution, one bait held out to it, through obviously inspired reports in the American Press, was that Dr. Ralph Bunche, supposedly on "friendly terms" with Nehru, and, therefore, presumed to be "sympathetic" to India, was likely to be nominated as the new UN Representative. No sooner had India committed herself to accept the resolution than a slight shift was noticed in the American Press. The UN Mediator would be none other than the famous Admiral Nimitz; but don't worry, we will send out Dr. Bunche as his assistant. A few days passed, and the decoy-duck Dr. Bunche had gracefully vanished from the scene, leaving Admiral Nimitz to sail into view, as both UN Representative as well as omnipotent Plebiscite Administrator.

"Pressure tactics are being employed," reported the *Tribune*, "to send Admiral Nimitz on the Kashmir scene, but it is confidently stated that India will not accept him as one man Mediator." (March 16, 1950.)

India's objection to Nimitz was mainly on the ground that he was too well known a military expert. For the people of India and Kashmir, with their rich traditions of proud anti-imperialism, the crude sabre-rattling and militaristic bluster of Nimitz might be too bitter a pill to swallow. The Anglo-Americans, realising the wisdom of giving in on minor points when victory on the major points was assured, dropped the Admiral after weeks of haggling. And soon a substitute was discovered in Sir Owen Dixon, a man who, even in their own calculations, in view of the scheme of partition which they were now preparing to disclose, was a more convenient choice.

Dixon had the advantage over his militaristic rival of being ostensibly a High Court Judge, whose supposed "fairmindedness" and "impartiality" could be paraded and used as a convenient cover for the most sinister designs. Actually, of course, Dixon had proved his mettle as an astute and hardened diplomat in the two years of war when he acted as the Australian Government's representative in Washington, and in the period of his service under General MacArthur's strict supervision in Japan.

But notwithstanding his long record as a reliable servitor of the Anglo-Americans, his masters were not prepared to leave anything to chance. His appointment was followed by the candid announcement that before he went out to

India to form an "independent" judgement, he would first arrive to "study the Kashmir situation"—in America!—and, in discussions with the Anglo-American representatives in the Security Council, would receive a careful briefing.

The Anglo-American Press, of course, made no secret of the policy Dixon would now be required to follow. The *Manchester Guardian* wrote without much beating about the bush:

"Many people who have studied conflicts similar to the Kashmir conflict doubt whether any settlement can be made in Kashmir except by partition.... It seems possible that in the partition plan India might accept a division which will rectify in Pakistan's favour the present cease-fire line."

As for the Valley, the *Manchester Guardian* tried to make out that it could go neither to Pakistan nor to Hindustan, but it tactfully refrained from mentioning the scheme the imperialist Powers really had in mind, "neutralised" entity ruled directly by Admiral Nimitz. As a first step towards suggesting this solution, it asked:

"Could it not be left for the time as a neutralised entity ruled by a coalition of Sheikh Abdullah and Mr. Ghulam Abbas, Head of the Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference?" (*Manchester Guardian*, May 3, 1950.)

At the same time as the *Manchester Guardian*, the strategists of the Anglo-American bloc were privately and secretly laying down exactly the same line. The Bombay *Bharat's* special correspondent reported from London:

"Anglo-American representatives.... privately and unofficially suggested to Sir Owen Dixon a new compromise formula to resolve the Kashmir dispute... The formula they favoured was stated to be partitioning parts of Kashmir with a predominantly Hindu populated area which should merge with India, and the predominantly Muslim populated area to be incorporated into Pakistan. A new feature of the plan is that a plebiscite would be held only in parts of the Kashmir Valley, where the population is mixed." (May 30, 1950.)

And that, as is common knowledge, is exactly the line that Dixon pursued after observing, however, a few empty formalities which the UNCIP had in its time hesitated to fulfil. The UNCIP, as we have noted, had made no attempt to arrange direct negotiations between the two Governments, and had, on the other hand, hastily called off the

one such conference they had convened at the insistence of the Czechoslovak representative. That conference had been called off just after a similar joint conference of the military staff of India and Pakistan had ended in complete and all-round success.

By these tactics, the Anglo-Americans had failed to prove decisively that a settlement between the two Governments was impossible. And by this failure, they realised, they had opened themselves to serious attack.

Realising that the scheme of partition and the direct imperialist control over the Valley could not be pushed forward until it was demonstrated finally and conclusively that both the Governments were completely intransigent; and confident that by now the Commission's tactics had immeasurably widened the antagonism between the two, that both the Governments had been hardened in their opposite and irreconcilable stand, Dixon knew that he could now undertake what the Commission had not dared to do. Dixon arranged for, not one, but a whole series of conferences between India and Pakistan, and at the highest level! And by demonstrating the failure of these conferences, he proved just what the Anglo-Americans intended him to prove.

At these conferences, Dixon proceeded without any compunction to blast each one of the illusions the Indian Government had so fondly nursed, and on which it had diligently fed the Indian people. Whereas the valiant General MacNoughton had dared to suggest only equality and parity between the aggressor and the victim, the learned and "impartial" judge Dixon was daring and audacious enough to demand the predominance of the aggressor. Unfolding his plans for a UN Administration for Kashmir, Dixon suggested that in the strategic Northern areas, a Political Agent be appointed directly by the United Nations, to work through the assistant Political Agents and his existing staff. In the Pakistan-held areas, a UN Officer would be attached to every District Magistrate, this UN Officer being given the powers of *supervision*.

But in the areas under the National Conference Administration, he suggested not only that a UN Officer be attached to every District Magistrate, but that this UN Officer be given the powers to go through the administrative records and proceedings of the District Magistrate and of all officers subordinate to him. And the powers specified for this UN Officer in the areas held by the National Conference were to be, not merely supervision, but powers of "Observation, Inspection, Remonstrance and Report", and all legal powers of arrest and detention were to be removed

from the existing administration and taken over by these UN Officers. No warrants could be issued, no such powers could be exercised without first obtaining the written sanction of the UN Officer.

In fact, Sheikh Abdullah's Government in the Valley came in for a scathing attack and wholesale condemnation at Dixon's hands. He drew a lurid picture of "arbitrary powers" existing on the "Indian side of the cease-fire line", insinuated broadly that the personal liberty and safety of the inhabitants was not safe from arbitrary attack, and painted the common people as living under a terror regime:

"It was not easy to exclude the danger that the inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir would vote under fear and apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are not a high-spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part, they are illiterate. There were large numbers of regular soldiers of the Indian army, as well as of the State militia and police, and under arms. The State Government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest." (Dixon's Report to Security Council, Sept. 27, 1950.)

The "alternative solution" that Dixon suggested and on which Birla's *Hindustan Times* had built many a fond hope, was none other than the old and well-known imperialist plan: partition of the State into three areas, two roughly equal areas to go to India and Pakistan, and the third, the Valley, to the Anglo-Americans under a UN Administration. But this too, only after Dixon had roundly abused the Indian Government as the one which by its obstinacy was putting a spoke in the imperialist wheel.

"I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would, in my opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse." (*Ibid.*)

Even the embarrassing question of aggression by the Pakistan Government, a question which neither the big guns of the Security Council, nor the astute diplomats on the Commission, nor even the battle-hardened General MacNoughton had dared to face, a question to which, India had firmly believed, there could be no answer, was tackled and disposed of with an astonishing boldness by Dixon. You

want me to name Pakistan as an aggressor, he asked. All right, if you insist, I'll note it down in my files. But that won't get you anywhere. It is just a legalistic quibbling with words. Pakistan is a party to the Kashmir dispute because we must have a second party to keep the dispute alive. And, whether you like it or not, we will treat it as an equal party.

"I was prepared to adopt the view," he wrote in his report, "that when the frontiers of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were crossed on, I believe, October 20, 1947, by hostile elements it was contrary to International Law, and that when in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with International Law."

But, he hastened to add lest India interpret this as a substantiation of her basic stand and claims—

"The question whether Pakistan had or had not been an aggressor had, to my mind, nothing to do with the results of a partition.... To agree that Pakistan should take under partition a part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, she took not merely an interest in, but sovereignty of, the territory... I do not understand how, in such a settlement, the doctrine that Pakistan is an aggressor, having no legitimate interest, could continue to apply." (*Ibid.*)

With a single stroke of the pen, with a rapid juggling of words, the one fundamental position which the Indian Government had looked upon as its trump-card was knocked out of its hands.

With that Dixon came straight to the solution the imperialist Powers always had in mind.

"I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between India and Pakistan, it now lies in partition, and in some means of allocating the Valley rather than in an overall plebiscite."

Now only one difficulty remained to be tackled: the provision of the earlier Security Council resolution, requiring the "Mediator" to obtain the "consent" of the parties to his proposals. By this time, the Indian Government, through its suicidal policy of surrendering repeatedly to the Anglo-American bloc, had already allowed Kashmir to be dragged to the very brink of the precipice. Only one last and final

step remained to hurl it into the yawning abyss below. From this final step the Nehru Government, despite the pressure of the reactionary Birla group, shrank in horror. Dixon saw plainly that so long as the Security Council allowed India the luxury of voicing her own feelings in the matter, neither the persistent proddings of the Anglo-Americans and their Indian stooges, nor his own clever coaxing would persuade India to plunge Kashmir, willingly and with open eyes, to her doom. Therefore, India's say in the matter must be taken away. The Anglo-Americans must arm themselves with powers to push Kashmir forcibly, whether India liked it or not, over the edge. After all, recalled the eminent jurist Dixon, the criminal in the dock is not required to give his consent to accepting the hangman's noose. Why then must they wait for India to "agree" when Sir Owen Dixon had already found her guilty and condemned her before the eyes of the world!

The *London Times* had already, on the eve of Dixon's appointment, indicated this line:

"The Security Council should either insist on the differences... being referred to arbitration — *whether India likes it or not* — or should go straight to the root of the matter and insist on the armed forces of both sides being removed and replaced by an international police force." (Feb. 28, 1950.)

And so, Dixon dutifully discovered that—

"Unfortunately, all this has been made to depend on the agreement of the parties.... The fact remains that under the resolution the agreement of India to the course to be pursued in these matters is a condition precedent to carrying out a plebiscite of the State and there is no such agreement."

Thus, Dixon disposed of every factual difficulty in the settlement of the Kashmir problem with a boldness and success of which his eminent predecessors had not even dreamt. And in every proposal, he administered one rude shock to India after another.

In his joint conference, Dixon made numerous suggestions. But not one suggestion on the lines of the bland and profuse assurances Sir Terence Shone had so obligingly given, and which had sent Sir B. N. Rau and the *Hindustan Times* into such raptures of delight, except, of course, partition and the taking over of the Valley by the Anglo-Americans.

In his joint conferences Dixon carried out every one of the dictates his Anglo-American masters had so carefully given him. Yet, progressive elements in India were met with a storm of angry denials, when, during his discussions in America, they had warned Kashmir of the dangerous intrigues behind the appointment of Dixon; when they had pointed out that Dixon was not coming with the open mind of an impartial judge as Kashmir was made to believe, but was coming armed with a set and sinister Anglo-American plan; when they had suggested that in spreading the fantastic lie that the Anglo-Americans had swung over, at last, to "our" side, India's leaders were either trying deliberately to fool the people, or had been completely fooled themselves.

Birla's scribes, particularly, foaming at the mouth and snarling with rage, sprang to dig their teeth into those who had dared to doubt the benevolence of their master's masters.

"One would have supposed that he (Dixon)... would enjoy the same immunity from libellous criticism as is accorded to a Supreme Court Judge. It is, therefore, surprising to find him attacked in a weekly paper, which accuses him of not being a free agent, and of having come under an Anglo-American mandate to implement a cut-and-dried plan by which the Valley of Kashmir is to be turned into an Anglo-American war-base, nominally under the control of the United Nations.... This seems to be no ordinary libel but an intolerable outrage upon the public." (*Hindustan Times*, June 24, 1950.)

Unfortunately for Birla and his tribe, history put the "Supreme Court Judge" Dixon, together with his faithful "nationalist" servitors, as common criminals squarely in the dock.

X

The Disillusionment Begins

THE Dixon Report proved to be the proverbial last straw. Nehru's reaction to it was violent in the extreme. Indian newspapers remarked that seldom in the last two years had he been seen to use such sharp and forthright expressions. Referring to what he called "Dixon's major condition", namely, "a complete transfer of the pre-

sent Government of Kashmir to a UN authority," Nehru declared at a Press conference in Delhi:

"Any proposal to push out the Government of Kashmir during a plebiscite was patently a proposal of appeasement of the aggressor. It meant that you wanted the aggressor to succeed.

"He was not aware of any Government anywhere, unless they were in a state of disruption, which would accept a proposal for handing over all governmental functions to a Plebiscite Administrator or Commission during the period of plebiscite... The Government of India were not in a state of disruption and they did not propose to accept any proposal which was not only so contrary to their dignity and the facts of the situation and went against everything that had been agreed to in the last two years, but was bound to lead to all kinds of trouble... 'It seems to me really an extraordinarily illogical approach to the question. So far as the Government of India are concerned, it is absolutely impossible for them to accept it, whatever the consequences. There the matter ends.'"

The imperialist agent, Dixon, and his sinister proposals received more pointed public attention from Nehru than perhaps any of the Anglo-American solutions freely offered in the past. But even at this stage, Nehru's fire was concentrated on Pakistan. *The hidden hand behind the whole Kashmir affair, the real villain-of-the-piece behind Pakistan's various moves, the real game behind the Anglo-American attempts to overthrow the Sheikh Abdullah Government was still not unmasked and exposed.*

"If Sir Owen Dixon's proposals to push out the Kashmir Government and the Government of India were accepted," said Nehru at his Press conference, "it would mean 90 per cent of the victory for Pakistan."

Asked whether he would put the blame on Pakistan for the failure of the Dixon talks, Nehru replied, "I put the blame cent per cent on Pakistan for the whole Kashmir trouble.

"If we are up against a blank wall in regard to Kashmir, it is because every time Pakistan wants by pressure to create conditions of special advantage to itself in regard to a plebiscite."

And so on and so forth. Pakistan was singled out as the main, indeed the sole enemy, *forgetting the plain and obvious fact that ever since January 1, 1948, when the Kashmir*

question was handed over to the imperialist-dominated Security Council, and more particularly since January 1, 1949, when the cease-fire was announced, the Anglo-American grip over the Kashmir problem had become unquestioned and complete. The initiative had passed entirely into their hands and both India and Pakistan had been reduced to mere automatons, being forced to assume a more and more subordinate role.

By this time, it was obvious that neither was solely or separately responsible for the ever-growing insolubility of the Kashmir dispute. *It was imperialism, which had consciously and deliberately manoeuvred for a sharpening of the differences, for a prolongation of the dispute. And both the Governments, dependent as they were on the imperialists, had entered into a frantic race to outbid each other in winning the favour of the Anglo-American "Mediators." And both had for two long years played straight into the imperialist hands.*

But by now, by the time of the Dixon Report, a sharp and vital difference was noticeable between the two. Whereas the Pakistan Government could still pretend to palm off its servile policies as having won it the favour of the Anglo-Americans, and as likely to bring it rich dividends over Kashmir, the reactionary surrenders of India on the Kashmir issue had only resulted in complete and utter disaster.

From these policies, the Nehru Government had still, even at this stage, shown no inkling of a desire to break. Confident, as Dixon was from the very start, that in the context of their basic policies, neither Government could escape from the vicious circle into which the imperialists had set them, and that by now neither Government could make an attempt to arrive at a mutual settlement, he had blandly suggested that the Security Council should retire for a while, and leave the parties to solve the dispute between themselves. If you don't want us to settle your affairs for you, we will sit back in the spectator's ring. Let the world see, how, when the firm hand of the Pax Britannica is lifted from your land, you fly at each other's throats!

The rulers of Pakistan promptly set up a cry, refusing to let go the protective "umpiring" of the Anglo-Americans. Nehru, on the other hand, verbally welcomed the suggestion, but made no move to implement it. *It was obvious that the Indian Government was content with whatever portion of Kashmir lay within its sphere; that it was willing to write off the areas which had fallen to Pakistan's lot; and that, given the basic policies of the two Governments,*

no effort at a lasting and permanent solution of the Kashmir dispute would be made.

It was obvious also that without a lasting, permanent and peaceful solution the political and economic crisis in Kashmir could never be solved, the initiative would remain in imperialist hands, and their intervention in Kashmir—and in both India and Pakistan — would continue unabated.

In the interval after the Dixon Report, various and conflicting suggestions were mooted in the imperialist Press. One day Nehru would be roundly abused for daring to make his historic peace offer to Truman and Stalin; the next day he would be praised to the skies in an undisguised endeavour to woo him back to the parental fold. The *United Press of America* came forward to assure that—

“The United States Government maintains a strict ‘hands off’ attitude towards the Kashmir dispute.... However, some officials privately express the opinion that partition of the State is the only solution.” (*Hindu*, August 31, 1950.)

But the London *Times* had made up its mind that this hesitation to mention partition openly was now no longer necessary. The old tactful reticence must now come to an end. The time had come for a public and active avowal of the imperialist stand:

“The hope that India and Pakistan would be able to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiations on their own initiative was unlikely to be fulfilled now... At a very early stage in the dispute the advantages of partitioning Kashmir were evident. They are even more apparent now. If the Security Council were to give a decisive lead in favour of partitioning, it is not impossible that... (it) might gradually overcome their present intransigence.” (Quoted in *Tribune*, Aug. 27, 1950.)

And as if to help the Anglo-Americans out of their hesitations in pushing through the partition of Kashmir, as if to justify the London *Times* in the hope that a “decisive lead in favour of partitioning” would not lead to a widespread and indignant revolt, before any of the known imperialist agents in India could bring themselves to open their mouths, our erstwhile revolutionary, Syt. J. P. Narayan, rushed forward in the unenviable role of the first Indian leader to publicly accord his blessings to the Anglo-American plan. In a speech at the Annual Convention of the Bihar Socialist Party in September, 1950, in which he hailed the efforts of Butcher MacArthur to shower “peace” over

Korea's defenceless villages and towns, and declared that "the effort of the United Nations to maintain peace in Korea should receive our support", he had an equally revolutionary advice for Kashmir.

"If partition is inevitable," the 'Hero of 1942' advised wisely, "that price should also be paid so that the country might go forward.... It was time that the Kashmir question was solved no matter what the cost." (*Hindustan Standard*, Sept. 23, 1950.)

The immediate implications of the Anglo-American plan for partition were made clear shortly afterwards by a *Times of India* report:

"An attempt may be made to revive Sir Owen Dixon's proposal for a UN Administration over the Kashmir Valley, pending final settlement and partition of the rest of the State." (Oct. 31, 1950.)

The significance of this reported move was not difficult to see. For the National Conference leadership the Dixon proposals had already sown the seeds of final disillusionment. Kashmir was already beginning to think in terms of reorganising its mass movement to face and fight the totally unacceptable imperialist plans. Kashmir had embarked on a programme of widespread land reforms. And these land reforms, the imperialist strategicians realised, if they were implemented thoroughly, honestly, directly through popularly-elected organs of an awakened peasantry, would spell disaster for their plans. As early as 1949, the *New York Herald-Tribune* had referred to the proposed land reforms as the one factor which might upset all their facile calculations.

"Best reports from inside the State indicate that if a plebiscite were held at once, Pakistan would win. But if time is given for the pro-Indian Premier Sheikh Abdullah to extend land reforms.... India might well come on top of the voting." (July 11, 1949.)

This then was the real meaning of the *Times of India* report: Grab the Valley, throw out the Abdullah regime, before Kashmir's national movement has the time to turn the tables against us. This was the imperialist plan which Syt. J. P. Narayan had rushed so eagerly to support—rushed in "where angles fear to tread."

But the hopes and speculations of the imperialist Press were not yet destined to bear fruit. The heads of the Anglo-American diplomats were already overfull with the disa-

sters of their "Far Eastern Affairs". In their own camp, following the fiasco of their armed intervention in Korea, utter confusion reigned.

At the same time, they were content to wait judiciously for another few months, to demonstrate to the world once more that neither of the two Governments was prepared to make use of the opportunity Dixon had given them; neither was prepared to arrive at a settlement on their own.

And not until January 1951, at the London Commonwealth Premiers' Conference, could they make up their mind finally to make another move.

The choice of the Commonwealth Conference as the most convenient place to unfold the next stage in the imperialist plans, and to bring the concerted pressure of the entire British Empire to bear on India, was no mere accident. *By this time the Soviet Union had returned to the Security Council. The Anglo-American newspapers had repeatedly expressed their fears of an open discussion on the Kashmir question in the presence of the Soviet delegation, particularly since their unhappy experience with the Czechoslovak member of the Kashmir Commission who had so mercilessly exposed their double-dealings and intrigues. Only recently the Moscow radio had torn the mask off the Dixon proposals, and laid bare the real designs behind them:*

"This proposal (to place Kashmir under a UN Administration) is looked upon in India as an open attempt by the Anglo-American imperialists, whose will Dixon was executing, to put their hands on the strategically important regions of Kashmir. Having established their own administration in Kashmir, the Anglo-American imperialists could have postponed the plebiscite indefinitely under the pretext of lack of agreement between India and Pakistan." (Reported in *Times of India*, Aug. 28, 1950.)

On his return to the Security Council, Jacob Malik had again expressed himself on the Kashmir question, and, in one curt sentence, had summed up his Government's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of smaller nations and of fighting to expose the intervention by imperialist Powers:

"Asked what the Soviet attitude towards Dixon Report would be, Mr. Malik said, 'We want the Kashmir question to be settled outside the Security Council between the parties themselves.'" (*Hindustan Times*, Nov. 4, 1950.)

How deep was their fear lest the Soviet delegate deliver again those powerful blows to their schemes which they had received earlier at the hands of Dr. Chyle, can be gauged by a news item in November 1950, that Britain had hurriedly suggested the reference of the Kashmir question to the five non-permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., to those five American satellites who could be depended upon to carry out their master's dictates faithfully, to the exclusion, again, of the Soviet Union.

And so, true to their traditions, the secret Commonwealth Conference room was chosen as the convenient place where further manoeuvres could be made, and another major and decisive step could be taken in their plan to grab Kashmir.

The three proposals which the Commonwealth Prime Ministers put forward, mainly at the instance of the pro-American members of the Commonwealth, New Zealand and Australia — the proposals to directly bring in Australian and New Zealand troops, or to allow Admiral Nimitz to raise an army of his own, or to bring in Pakistan troops for a "joint policing" by India and Pakistan — did, indeed, mark a major and decisive step in the stage-by-stage disclosure of the imperialist plans on Kashmir.

But by this time an equally major and decisive development was taking place in India, a development which threatened to meet the imperialist plan in bold and open challenge and to finally ring its doom.

America's brutal and shameless war of aggression against the Korean people, the murderous hell that MacArthur had let loose on Asian soil, and the threat which MacArthur held out to exterminate a whole nation in the terrible holocaust of the atom bomb, horrified the entire Indian people and left them aghast. A flaming storm of anger swept through the country and forced the Nehru Government to think again over its pro-imperialist foreign policy before the American war-chariot dragged it down to hell.

"No other single-factor", a *CrossRoads* article remarked, "has served more to unite Asian opinion against the imperialist Powers, to set in motion a wave of anger which finds moving expression in the persistent demand for Asian solidarity with the heroic peoples of China and Korea." (Jan. 26, 1951.)

The Indian Government which had been following a policy of repeated surrenders and compromise on the Kashmir issue—

“...now finds that the people are in no mood to accept the compromise which entails economic and political bondage within the so-called Commonwealth which is being rapidly reduced to vassaldom by US imperialism.”
(*Ibid.*)

The anti-national surrenders on the Kashmir issue during the last three years had already resulted in disaster. Any further yielding, particularly on the question of allowing in Australian and New Zealand troops—of whom the people of Bombay had had such disgusting experience during the war—would be an outrage on the Kashmiri people. And in the present upsurge against imperialism, the entire Indian people may be galvanised to rise up in protest.

For the first time in the last three years, the Indian Government felt “compelled to adopt a stand which sharply demarcates India from the war-plans of imperialism.” Nehru had to confront the imperialists with a sharp and decisive “NO”.

And in Kashmir, Nehru’s rejection of the Commonwealth proposals was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm, paralleled only by the widespread anger and resentment with which the news of the proposals themselves was received.

In one of his strongest denunciations yet of imperialist attempts to solve the Kashmir problem in utter disregard of the people’s will, Sheikh Abdullah characterised the proposals as “vicious” and “humiliating” to his people. *The proposals, he declared plainly, emerge not from a desire to find a “lasting solution” for Kashmir, but from the desire of “some Commonwealth Prime Ministers” to render India and Pakistan “jointly useful for the defence of the Commonwealth.” And he added the timely warning reminiscent of the Moscow radio’s exposure of the Dixon plan: “History has taught us that once foreign troops occupy an area under one pretext or the other, they come to stay.”*

Sheikh Abdullah drew pointed attention towards the “bitter and gruesome lessons of Korea” and declared his firm determination to fight against the “planting of another MacArthur on Kashmir’s tender soil.”

He referred bitterly to the previous attempts of the Security Council to “solve” the dispute, and to the “unsympathetic and partial attitude of certain Big Powers”, whose recent proposals also “betrayed the clouded outlook that is usually brought to bear on the solution of our issue.”

Elucidating this portion of Sheikh Abdullah’s statement,

the Executive Committee of the Srinagar District National Conference said in an outspoken resolution:

“This partial and one-sided outlook has been proved decisively by our constant and repeated experience at the UNO. The dilatory tactics of the Big Powers over Kashmir as contrasted with their unseemly haste in precipitating a war in Korea; the refusal of these Big Powers to name the aggressor for three years, though the fact of unprovoked aggression, and the hidden hand behind the aggression, have been patently clear; their refusal to call for the withdrawal of the aggressor armies even when ultimately forced to recognise the aggressor; the premium which they have put on naked aggression by agreeing to the illegal partitioning of our country, and to all the illegal demands of Pakistan; the pressure brought to bear on us from behind the scenes in the UNO, and through the UNCIP itself, to force us to yield to these illegal demands, and to thwart the assertion of our right to self-determination — not to speak of the direct aid given in 1947 by British officials in Pakistan, by Governor Cunningham, Mr. Powell and Brigadier Scott to the armies illegally invading Kashmir—all these glaring facts of history cry out to indict the Big Powers and speak volumes in testimony of our Quaid-i-Azam’s declaration: ‘Nowhere do I find a desire to secure justice and peace for the people of Kashmir’.”

As the wave of anger and protest mounted inside Kashmir, another heartening development was afoot in India and Pakistan. Both the Governments had decided to start negotiations on February 19 for the resumption of normal trade. Panicky lest the negotiations succeed and result in growing friendship between the two Governments, thus depriving the imperialists of many a fruitful opportunity for intervention, the Anglo-Americans decided to strike a hurried and desperate blow.

On the same day as the negotiations were to begin, they issued to the Press a joint resolution on Kashmir which they had decided to sponsor in the Security Council. By thus bringing up the question of Kashmir, they hoped to disrupt the trade negotiations.

This joint Anglo-American resolution was a concentrated form of all the poison-broths the imperialists had brewed during the last three years, the stark and naked reality of imperialism’s final plan for Kashmir, which in the past they had revealed only gradually, tactfully, bit by bit,

but which they now threw, complete and finished, as an open challenge right in the Nehru Government's face.

The resolution challenged the Kashmir National Conference for having dared to convene a Constituent Assembly to decide the future of Kashmir. It armed the new United Nations Representative with wider powers than ever before, powers not merely to "suggest plans" for demilitarisation, but to order both the Governments to withdraw their armies on the lines he laid down. It provided for the entry into Kashmir of a United Nations army, it provided for partition, it provided for arbitration—and it provided, of course, for a UN Administration and for the taking over of the State by the supreme dictator, Admiral Nimitz.

Both the National Conference and the Indian Government rejected this resolution with indignation and scorn, and promptly the Anglo-Americans came forward to try their usual dual tactics. A pretence of retreat, a show of "modifying" the resolution in parts was made with one hand; with the other, the starvation conditions in India and her request for foodgrains were used as a means of pressure and blackmail to force India to its knees.

But this time, Nehru's reaction showed a change. The Indian Government was prepared to call the bluff on both the American moves. No longer did it seem in a mood to be bullied, blackmailed or duped. The Government of India refused to accept any American offer of food having political strings, and, contrary to its past practice, publicly expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's China. And as regards the amended resolution, Nehru declared that it still remained unacceptable.

This time, the "modifications" in the Anglo-American resolution are again as crude and obvious a hoax as was the loudly-acclaimed dropping, last year, of the much-publicised MacNoughton plan. The earlier resolution sought to lay down all the various steps required for grabbing Kashmir in one single comprehensive draft. The amended resolution merely sought to divide up this comprehensive imperialist plan into two time-stages: From the appointment, now, of the new UN Mediator and Arbitrator to the "demilitarisation", as the first stage; and later, from the demilitarisation to the taking over of Kashmir directly through a zonal plebiscite or partition, or through an outright garrisoning by UN troops.

A simultaneous publication of both the stages in one resolution was realised to be too bitter a pill to swallow in one gulp. Hence, "in deference to India's feelings", it was

divided into two doses. The first dose has been given in the form of the "amended" resolution, which, whether India likes it or not, will be forced down her throat. And the second dose has been kept considerably in abeyance, but will follow rapidly and inevitably as soon as India shows signs of submitting to the first.

The dosage has been tactfully reduced; a feeble attempt to sugar-coat it has also been made. But there has been no watering down of its contents, no modification of the elements of the mixture. In the "amended" resolution, there has not been a single amendment or modification of the essential points provided for the first stage in the earlier resolution.

The Mediator is instructed, as before, to proceed to "effect the demilitarisation" of Kashmir within three months. At the same time, the provision for arbitration remains. The only change in the provisions for the first stage is that the new Mediator has not been specifically asked to proceed along the lines of the Dixon recommendations on demilitarisation, and that, instead, the two resolutions of the Kashmir Commission, of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, have been reiterated as the basis of demilitarisation.

But let there be no illusion about this empty show of a change. The Anglo-American representatives, in explaining the new resolutions, have hastened to point out that though the resolution itself may not mention the Dixon recommendations, which effected a complete equality and parity between India and Pakistan, yet the Mediator would be expected to keep the Dixon proposals as guiding points in view.

"The amended resolution," said American representative Earnst Gross, "now charges the UN Representative with the duty of effecting demilitarisation on the basis of the 1948 and 1949 resolutions. That did not mean the UN Representative should disregard the efforts of more than two years in attempting to implement those two resolutions, as experienced by General MacNoughton and Sir Owen Dixon." (*Hindustan Times*, March 23, 1951.)

And what are these two resolutions which the "amended" resolution holds on to so firmly, and in which Nehru and B. N. Rau have also reiterated their abiding faith? They are none other than the poisoned fruit of the Commission's unprincipled and shameful intrigues. It was just these two resolutions that Dr. Chyle opposed and condemned in his

minority report to the Security Council. It was just these resolutions of which, encouraged by Dr. Chyle's scathing condemnation, even the *Hindustan Times* took courage to write:

"The UNCIP resolutions (of 1948 and 1949) cannot be of practical help in settling the Kashmir issue, and it is good that Dr. Chyle's report has underlined this point...

"The main UNCIP report is based on the Commission's resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949... General MacNoughton based his proposals on the main UNCIP report and, therefore, his attempt at mediation has not proved successful." (Dec. 28, 1950.)

But these very resolutions are being warmly hailed by the Indian Government today as the only guarantee of a fair and democratic plebiscite! No wonder Earnst Gross was quick to seize upon this commitment, declaring in undisguised glee:

"We are most pleased to note the reaffirmation by the representative of India of his firm adherence to the two resolutions and his statement that they contain adequate provisions for a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices." (*Hindustan Times*, March 23, 1951.)

The real task of the new Mediator will be to utilise just such commitments, to twist and turn them as he likes, and to see if he can get India to make once again, in the convenient isolation of the secret conference room, further commitments which India finds impossible to make in the open Security Council debate.

And the Government of India, let it not be forgotten, has already declared its willingness to confer with such a Mediator.

There is no denying the anger and indignation with which Nehru has received both the latest Security Council resolutions. But it is essential to note carefully the difficult position in which the Indian Government finds itself as a result of its previous surrenders, and the "commitments" the Anglo-Americans forced from it in the past because of its reactionary foreign policy.

In 1948, when the Kashmir question was first brought up before the Security Council, Ayyangar was still in a position to insist that the issue of dispute was merely the tribal invasion, and that the political future of the State and the Government of Kashmir were entirely internal matters

over which the Security Council could have no jurisdiction or control. Today, Nehru and B. N. Rau, in spite of India's rejection of the latest resolution, find it necessary to assure the Anglo-Americans that the Constituent Assembly will not in any way decide the future of Kashmir, nor challenge the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

"Will that Assembly (Constituent Assembly)," asked B. N. Rau in the Security Council debate, "decide the question of accession? My Government's view is that while it may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, they can take no decision on it." (*Hindustan Times*, March 11, 1951.)

In 1948, Sheikh Abdullah could tell the General Council of the National Conference that he had asked Ayyangar to withdraw the Kashmir case from the Security Council altogether. Today, Nehru has to express his helplessness in this regard, and speak up against those who advocate a withdrawal.

"First of all," said Nehru in his report to Parliament, "I am not sure if anything can be withdrawn at all in this way... Secondly, this will mean *our reorientating our whole basic policy towards the United Nations as well as the great nations in that organisation.*" (*Hindustan Times*, March 29, 1951—italics ours.)

In 1949, even Birla's papers expressed their dissatisfaction with the two resolutions of the Commission. Today, much to the intense satisfaction of the British and American delegates, the Indian representative has to stake his entire stand on these very resolutions.

There is no doubt that the anger and indignation of the Nehru Government has been aroused by the latest resolutions as never before. There is no doubt that the arrogance of the Anglo-Americans in passing the resolution in face of India's firm opposition has led throughout the country to a storm of resentment and protest. There is no doubt, also, that all India is willing and anxious to find the way out of the tangle which will extricate Kashmir from imperialism's clutches. And in Kashmir itself, it is clear that the latest Security Council debate has brought the naked imperialist designs before the eyes of the Kashmiri people this time more sharply and forcefully than ever before. This time, Sheikh Abdullah has expressed his firm determination to fight the Anglo-American manoeuvres, his complete disillusionment with the Security Council:

"The people of Kashmir . . . feel justly and finally thwarted in their hopes of a settlement being affected through the good offices of the United Nations."

(Sheikh Abdullah's statement, Feb. 19, 1951.)

Sheikh Abdullah, it seems, has given his final and decisive "No."

But the danger spots which already exist as the outcome of imperialism's three-year-old intrigues, and of the developments which have complicated Kashmir's internal situation, cannot be ignored.

The first set of dangers arise from the various "commitments" and "agreements" which the Anglo-Americans have already succeeded in wringing out of the Indian Government as the result of its reactionary policy of surrendering before imperialism.

The second set of dangers arise from the final and desperate determination of the imperialist Powers to clinch the Kashmir issue once and for all, before the anti-imperialist people of India and Pakistan decide to take it **out** of their hands.

"From all indications," says a special article in the *CrossRoads*; "it is apparent that the sponsors of this resolution and their satellites are determined, despite the firm opposition of India, to impose their plans on Kashmir." (March 2, 1951.)

The third, and by far the most serious, danger arises from the failure of the National Conference leadership to solve the Kashmiri people's most pressing needs, and its failure to keep the people united in a solid front of democratic, anti-imperialist struggle. The most serious danger arises from the sense of frustration and helplessness which has seized the common people as a result of this failure and from the consequent weakening of Kashmir's once-powerful national movement.

In 1947, when the progressive youth of the National Conference gave the call for armed resistance to the foreign invaders, the entire people rose as one man in response to the call. In 1948, when the National Conference leadership rejected the Security Council resolution and declared its determination to fight the Anglo-American intrigues, a thrill of joy and hope electrified the atmosphere. But it is an ominous reality, which Kashmir's patriots cannot afford to ignore, that when, in 1951, Sheikh Abdullah angrily denounces the latest proposals and hurls a challenge to the

Anglo-Americans, the people fail to respond as enthusiastically as they used to before.

Kashmir's patriots can ignore this reality only at their own peril. It is obvious that the imperialist Powers will prepare for a final showdown, and will utilise every weakness in our position, every chink in our armour, to strike with all their ferocity.

It is essential, therefore, that Kashmir's patriots find out immediately where the weak points in their defence lie, as well as the direction along which imperialism is likely to strike its blows, and prepare themselves in time to meet and fight back the imperialist onslaught.

XI

Kashmir Faces The Future

KASHMIR'S patriots must realise the extreme gravity and seriousness of the situation facing them today. They must understand that this time there is no room for complacency. India's rejection of the resolution in the Security Council debate, however reassuring for Kashmir it may be, does not by itself solve the Kashmir problem. Nor does it, by itself, suffice to save Kashmir fully and finally from further imperialist intrigues. It is essential, therefore, that the entire people of Kashmir, as well as of India and Pakistan, review the experience of the last few years, study the concrete forms in which imperialist manoeuvres have expressed themselves, and from the actual facts, the actual history, draw the necessary lessons.

In the actual experience of the Kashmir dispute, three points appear to stand out most sharply.

[1] First, that imperialism's first and foremost weapon has been to engineer deliberately a bitter hostility between India and Pakistan. Through a prolonged and carefully planned process, through the treacherous device of giving false promises to both, imperialism deliberately encouraged both to take up opposite and irreconcilable positions and thereby made more complex a problem which otherwise would not have appeared impossible of solution. As a *Telepress* message, quoted in the *CrossRoads*, pointed out:

“If Maharaja Sir Hari Singh's princely State of Kashmir had been located in Central India, the dispute between India and Pakistan. . . . might have been settled

long ago by the parties concerned... But Kashmir is situated in the extreme Northern corner between India, Pakistan and China. The North-West Frontier of Kashmir lies about 50 kilometres from the Soviet Tajikistan across a narrow strip of mountainous territory belonging to Afghanistan." (March 2, 1951.)

There you have the truth. But for the deliberate mischief engineered by the Anglo-Americans, in the sacred name of the United Nations and of "peace", the "dispute.... might have been settled long ago by the parties concerned," in the manner in which many other disputes have already been settled, through the simple device of direct, friendly negotiations.

But imperialists sabotaged every move for direct negotiations until, by the time of Dixon, they were convinced that the differences were already so hardened that any negotiations were bound to fail.

Having widened the hostility between the two Governments, the next and most effective weapon used by the imperialists to beat down both has been—the improved and modernised version of their traditional communal riots—the threat of war between India and Pakistan.

With the success of the treacherous Anglo-American manoeuvres of the last three years, the Kashmir problem has been caught in a vicious circle. Direct settlement between the parties has been deliberately made impossible; a peaceful settlement appears possible only through Anglo-American "mediation"; anxious to win the Mediator's favour, both parties outdo one another in fawning on him; the dishonest Mediator accepts gifts from both, and then proceeds to demand the complete surrender of Kashmir's vital national interests; if any of the parties resist to surrender, the imperialists know how to create conditions to plunge both the Dominions into war; faced with the threat of war, the parties run again to imperialism, seeking its "aid" in another effort for a "peaceful settlement" — and then again, through the round of the whole circle; the price which imperialism demands for its "peace" efforts, the surrender of Kashmir's freedom, is a price which neither Kashmir nor India can afford to accept; hence resistance—and so again, with greater speed and force, as the wheel turns round and round—the dire threat of war!

And so the cycle threatens to go on and on.

Kashmir can ignore the dangers of this vicious circle only at its own peril. Kashmir must succeed in breaking out of this circle, if its future is not to be doomed.

And the only way in which this cycle can be broken is by mobilising the people of both India and Pakistan to "lift the Kashmir issue out of the grooves of an Indo-Pakistan conflict," to force their respective Governments to arrive at a just, peaceful and democratic solution *minus* the intervention of imperialism. *One proposal which can form the basis of such an agreed solution is that a plebiscite be held under a Commission of the five Big Powers, including the Soviet Union and People's China.*

Kashmir remembers only too well how just one representative of the anti-imperialist, democratic Powers on the UNCIP, Dr. Chyle, tore the mask off imperialism's sinister intrigues. It is easy, therefore, for Kashmir to see that when the mighty Soviet Union and People's China are both present on a Plebiscite Commission, the imperialists will not dare to play lightly with the fate of Kashmiri people.

It is, therefore, in Kashmir's own vital national interests to call on the democratic peoples, and the Governments of both India and Pakistan, to jointly take up this proposal.

But not only in Kashmir's own interest. For the people of India and Pakistan themselves, the danger of imperialism whipping up passions for war and seeking excuses to intervene in both the countries, if they do not come forward with a peaceful solution, is not to be minimised. The start was made some months ago with the bellicose brandishing of the threat of "jihad". To this obviously inspired piece of provocation, Nehru has already fallen a victim. In a recent statement he has already advanced the counter-threat that any armed attack on Kashmir will be regarded as an attack on India.

The danger of the vicious cycle being set in motion again is very real. Caught helplessly as the three Governments already are in this vice, the propaganda may soon be set afoot that the only two "practicable alternatives" which face the Indian and Pakistan Governments are: *Either* a settlement through Anglo-American mediation, *or* a disastrous war which every honest person would seek to avoid. In other words, *either* a peace on the terms the Anglo-Americans dictate, *or* war.

It was in the name of just such a "peaceful settlement" that our stalwart revolutionary, J. P. Narayan, had declared soon after the Dixon report: "It was time that the Kashmir question was solved *no matter what the cost.*"

But what does "peace through Anglo-American mediation" mean? It means partition of Kashmir and the setting up of an Anglo-American administration in the Valley. It means handing over Kashmir to Admiral Nimitz and to his Australian and New Zealand troops. It means allowing the Anglo-Americans to establish themselves in Kashmir, to use Kashmir as a base against the freedom and integrity of both India and Pakistan. It means allowing the Anglo-Americans the power to interfere in the internal affairs of both.

A "settlement" through Anglo-American mediation means a settlement at the cost of our freedom.

This then is the real meaning of the "practical" alternatives which the imperialists, with their vicious grip over the Kashmir problem, seek to set us: *Either* surrender the freedom of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, *or* we will plunge all of you in war.

It is not, however, difficult to see that these are not really two alternatives but only two sides of the same imperialist coin, two complementary parts of the same imperialist policy, either of which leads to the other.

The only real alternatives are: EITHER Anglo-American intervention *and* domination *and* war, OR a joint and mighty offensive of the united peoples of Kashmir, India and Pakistan, against imperialist intervention. EITHER complete extinction for Kashmir, and the further tying up of India and Pakistan to the imperialist war-chariot, OR the joining together of the peoples to seek a just and democratic solution, which guarantees the freedom and integrity of Kashmir's national movement.

And precisely at a time when the leaderships of India and Pakistan will be provoked by imperialism into mutual war or threats of war, it is all the more essential for the democratic forces and the common peoples to join together, determined to succeed in this task.

It is, therefore, not only in Kashmir's own interests, it is equally in the vital national interest of India and Pakistan to rally round the slogan of a five-Power Commission including the Soviet Union and People's China, as one essential point of a democratic solution. And the other point for a peaceful solution can and must be evolved, jointly, immediately and without fail.

That is the only way in which imperialists' most effective weapon can be knocked out of their hands.

[2] The second factor which, our experience shows, has helped the imperialists in pushing forward their deep-laid plans, has been the compromising and vacillating policies

of the Indian Government. Wooing the Anglo-American bloc, as the Indian Government was, for favours and for American loans; having agreed, at the insistence of American Ambassador Grady, to the postponement of nationalisation "for a period of ten years"; having launched a fierce offensive against the working-class and democratic movements in India to prove their *bona fides*, just at the time when the Kashmir question had been handed over obligingly to the Anglo-Americans, and when Gopaldaswami Ayyangar was being "too much twitted" in the Security Council (*vide* Ayyangar's speech in the Security Council, see page 17); and being pressed by reactionary circles in India to submit docilely to every imperialist outrage, lest the Anglo-American masters get annoyed—the Indian Government failed at decisive moments to take a clear and firm stand.

Every time the Kashmir question came up for open discussion at the Security Council, the Indian Government began with a rejection of the resolution and with uncompromising speeches of strong opposition. So it was in March-April 1948 when the Indian delegate Ayyangar was forced to protest solemnly: "My Government has not been treated with the dignity to which it is entitled." So it was also in early 1950 when the MacNoughton proposals were refused. And so it is today.

Every time India made a gesture of refusal, a wave of joy and hope ran through National Conference circles in Kashmir. Angry demonstrations against the Security Council were held. Vigorous speeches, calling upon the people for armed resistance to Anglo-American intervention, were made. Calls for United Front were given.

But every time the anger of Kashmir's national movement was thus visibly aroused, imperialists would redouble their pressure on the Indian Government to force it to surrender. For this, imperialists would successfully use the dual tactics of increased pressure behind the scenes, *plus* an ostensible show of retreat. Threats of economic sanctions against India, of cutting off her supplies of petrol and other essential commodities, were given with one hand; with the other, an empty show was made of "modifying" the Anglo-American resolutions in their phraseology, of "toning down" their most obnoxious features in an attempt to put them through, if not by an open Security Council debate, then through secret, behind-the-scene negotiations, through the "verdict" of an "impartial" "on-the-spot" Commission or Mediator or panel of Mediators. Experience, how-

ever, has shown that every opinion the Commission or the Mediators gave was, by a remarkable coincidence, exactly that which the Anglo-American themselves happened to want.

Faced with such dual tactics, not daring to come out in the open, in an open fight against the Anglo-Americans, the Indian Government would collapse. Bowing servilely before the imperialists above, afraid of any movement of mass protest amongst their own people below, it would hastily accept the "modified" version of the resolutions, and proceed to enter into negotiations with the imperialist-nominated Mediator. Thus the Indian Government intervened to call off Kashmir's growing movement of indignant protest in June 1948. Thus again it accepted the "modified" version of the MacNoughton plan in 1950.

But if India were still found to resist, imperialists had further tactics. A tremendous volume of propaganda would be worked up in the Anglo-American Press that all that the Anglo-Americans wanted was a "free and fair" plebiscite; that India was afraid to face such a plebiscite; that India was holding on to Kashmir unjustly and by force; that the continuation of the Kashmir deadlock was a threat to peace between India and Pakistan—and, to prove their point, the danger of war between the two countries would conveniently appear again.

Undoubtedly, this time again imperialists will resort to the usual tactics that we have seen in the last three years. Undoubtedly, there will be elements in the Indian ruling class who would again advocate a shameful surrender, calling it a wise compromise, who will look out eagerly for any "modified" and "toned down" version of the Anglo-American resolution, who will not dare to stand up to the terrible and tremendous pressure which the imperialists will bring to bear on us, or come out openly in a conflict with the Anglo-Americans.

But undoubtedly, also, this time the forces gathering to fight such a compromise are stronger than ever before.

Three decisive changes have taken place in the internal political situation. *Firstly*, there is the powerful anti-imperialist upsurge of the people of India brought about as a result of the horrifying American massacres in Korea. The democratic people of India, confused and misled since 1947 about the real nature and motives of imperialism, encouraged by a reactionary leadership to hail the most sinister imperialist plan to partition India with the cry of "Pandit Mountbatten Ki Jai", fed since then on illusions and

lies, have again been aroused through their own experience to an understanding of imperialism's present role. They are no longer prepared to take the crude Anglo-American bluster and threats lying down.

Secondly, the leaders of Kashmir have come to see that what the Anglo-Americans demand is not just a few concessions here and there, and a few "alterations" in their internal policies. What they demand plainly is the complete wiping out of the national movement, the complete subversion of the national government to their own "Interim" or Plebiscite Administrator. What the imperialists demand is the right to violate Kashmir's freedom and honour. No longer is it possible for any element of the National Conference to declare today — as one important leader did assert soon after the Dixon Report— that "it would be possible for us to come to terms" with the Americans but for the opposition of the Communists.

This time the National Conference leaders have spoken up not, as in the past, against any particular Security Council plan or point of any plan, but against the very possibility of receiving justice at the hands of the Security Council. Sheikh Abdullah's categorical declarations are not without significance:

"I do not find anywhere a desire to secure peace and justice for the people of Kashmir." (Press statement, Jan. 1951.)

"The people of Kashmir.... feel justly and finally thwarted in their hopes of a settlement being effected through the good offices of the United Nations." (Press statement, Feb. 1951.)

Thirdly, the Indian Government's policy of trying to outbid Pakistan in winning the favour of the Anglo-Americans, and consequently of not daring to come out openly to protest or fight against their most shameful intrigues, has already resulted in disaster. The policies of surrender have already come to the end of the tether. Today the next logical step in these policies can only be the offering up of Kashmir at the sacrificial altar. That is a step which the Indian Government dare not take, except at its own peril.

The Indian Government has itself reached a stage where, inevitably, it has to turn back if it wants to save Kashmir, and to save itself from the wrath of a betrayed people.

But the Nehru Government can save Kashmir only if it makes a complete break from its previous vacillating and compromising policies, only if it comes out in the open to

expose and fight, without any hesitation, the sinister Anglo-American manoeuvres. In other words, only if it is prepared to break from its political, economic and military alliances with British and American imperialisms, only if it breaks from the Commonwealth.

Since that is the only way in which Kashmir can be saved, it is in the interest of the *entire* national movement of Kashmir to raise its powerful voice, openly and immediately for this demand.

But, it is not in Kashmir's interests only. It is equally in the national interests of the people of India to doggedly fight against the old compromising and pro-imperialist policies which have led very nearly to Kashmir's ruin, and, in the interests of their own freedom, to force their Government to quit the British Commonwealth.

That is the only way in which the Indian people can save themselves from open imperialist intervention.

[3] The third factor, which in the last three years has helped the imperialists to succeed in their plans, has been the readiness of Pakistan's reactionary rulers to offer themselves as imperialists' loyal and willing tools.

Imperialism had from the very beginning looked upon the princely States as safe and convenient bulwarks of reaction, and had planned to use them— and to use Kashmir in particular— as a means to disrupt friendly relations between the peoples of India and Pakistan. In this they have had the willing and repeated support of Pakistan's reactionary rulers.

Immediately after the publication of the Cabinet Mission Memorandum on the Indian States, the League leaders rushed forward to welcome the British plans to maintain the princely States as "free" and "independent" units, and assured the princes of their stand on non-interference in their autocratic regimes. Mr. Jinnah had offered the princes that—

"If they wish to remain independent, and wish to negotiate or adjust any political or any relationships, such as commercial or economic ties, with Pakistan, we shall be glad to discuss or negotiate with them and they shall find us ready and willing to do so. (*Times of India*, July 18, 1947.)

Ever since then, right upto this day, the imperialists have found that in all their various manoeuvres and intrigues, in all the sinister plots that they hatched to grab Kashmir for themselves, they could rely on Pakistan's anti-people rulers for their loyal and ready support. Whether

it was the unprovoked armed invasion which the British launched, or the Security Council resolutions through which they demanded the handing over of the State to Admiral Nimitz; whether it was the scandalous double-dealing of the Kashmir Commission which sought to widen the differences between the parties, or the recent demand at the London Commonwealth Premiers' Conference for the stationing of Commonwealth troops; whether they moved openly and brazen-facedly through a Security Council resolution, or secretly and indirectly through threats of war between India and Pakistan and through back-stage pressure and intrigues, the Anglo-Americans found Liaqat Ali and Zafarullah ready to act as their faithful and pliable tools.

Liaqat Ali and Zafarullah have been able to conceal from the Pakistan people the real nature of their servile, pro-imperialist role by appearing before them as the saviours and liberators of the Kashmiri people. In this they were being helped by the bankrupt policies of the reactionary elements in the Indian Government which forced the National Conference to function within the framework of the Maharaja's bureaucratic administration, which stood in the way of full implementation of "New Kashmir", and which intervened time and again to call off the National Conference movement of popular indignation against imperialist intervention.

But the real meaning of the faithful services Pakistan's rulers have rendered imperialism cannot be concealed from all their people for all time. For, in order to palm themselves off as the liberators of Kashmir, and in order to justify their servile dependence on imperialist intervention and on imperialist armies in securing this "liberation", they have had to undertake an extremely difficult and tricky task. They have had to parade the imperialists also as selfless and disinterested champions of the freedom and democratic rights of the Kashmiri people.

Speaking at a Press conference in London, while on his way to Lake Success, Zafarullah expressed his helpless dependence on the British with a frankness which could not fail to open all Pakistan's eyes:

"Britain could help in a solution of Kashmir because of the unique background and historical understanding she had of the problems of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. That was why the Pakistan Government had been, and was continuously urging the United Kingdom to help in an effective solution." (Sept. 7, 1950.)

But the people of Pakistan have themselves experienced Britain's "unique historical understanding" and know what it really means. And however hard Zafarullah may try to sing hymns in its praise, they are not likely to be easily duped. The glorious traditions of anti-imperialism which even before the Mutiny of 1857 have been the Indian Mussalman's pride and the noble and lofty hatred of the *Farangi's* agents which through his entire cultural heritage he has imbibed, is still too vital, too living a force to allow him to swallow Zafarullah's sickening apologies and lies.

Even today, the "unique historical understanding" the British — and the Americans — are showing towards the people of Iran who are struggling desperately to rescue their national wealth from the imperialists' rapacious hands. the cold bloodedness with which they plot, in Iran, in Syria and in Lebanon, to assassinate the political agents of each other, and the cynicism with which they make and unmake governments and rulers at their will, is not lost on the people of Pakistan.

Indeed, the real meaning of their ruling classes' servile dependence on imperialist help in "solving" the Kashmir dispute is beginning to dawn on the Pakistani people. They see their rulers being forced today, because of this dependence, to invite Commonwealth troops into Kashmir and to lease out military bases in Quetta and Gilgit — just at the time when all Egypt is rising in revolt to hurl foreign troops into the sea. They see their rulers inviting the Americans, because of this dependence, to prospect for oil in Quetta— just at the time when the neighbouring Muslim countries of the Middle East are throwing the foreign oil companies out. And they see their rulers, forced by this very dependence, tying their country to imperialist war-chariot—just at the time when the imperialists are racing madly towards a war which will certainly ring their final doom, just at the time when other countries, unwilling to be dragged down to certain disaster, are attempting to break away from the war-plans before it is too late.

Speaking at a public meeting in Karachi at the time when the Americans were being beaten to a pulp in Korea, Liaquat Ali expressed the helplessness with which Pakistan's Government was being dragged along imperialism's war-path, in words which to the people of Pakistan sounded like a grim and ominous warning:

"Referring to critics who suggested that Pakistan should have remained neutral on the Korean issue, he (Liaquat Ali) said, when Pakistan was asking the Secu-

rity Council to force India to implement the Security Council's decision (re: Kashmir) how could she remain neutral?" (*Times of India*, Sept. 13, 1950.)

This then is the treacherous logic of the Pakistan Government's policies on Kashmir. This is the dangerous price it has to pay for the doubtful honour of winning Anglo-American support.

But support in what? In winning Kashmir for Pakistan? Do the rulers of Pakistan seriously believe, or expect their people to believe, that the Anglo-Americans have worked so hard and laboriously over the Kashmir dispute, that they have struggled with might and main, that they are undertaking the transport of a UN army and a costly UN administration, only to hand Kashmir over, free of cost, to Pakistan? Let the rulers of Pakistan not befool themselves with any such ridiculous illusions. Let them not forget that Kashmir's richest portions and most vital strategic areas have already been apportioned for themselves by the Anglo-Americans. Not for nothing have they worked so painstakingly and tirelessly to bring a UN administration into the Valley. Not for nothing have they been so impatient to set up military bases, immediately, without any delay, in Gilgit.

The rulers of Pakistan, who are dreaming happy dreams of territorial aggrandisement at the cost of Kashmir and with the self-denying help of the Anglo-Americans, would be well advised to shake themselves from slumber in time, lest the crafty imperialist Powers walk away quietly with whatever little wealth they happen to possess in their own country — leaving the Pakistan Government to lament its fate and recall Cervantes' sorrowful words: "Many go out for wool, but come back shorn."

Already, both Britain and America have been casting many a covetous eye on their natural resources and agricultural produce, and have been openly planning to keep Pakistan as a backward and impoverished supplier of raw materials—a convenient dumping ground for their surplus goods. On the same day as Liaquat Ali was publicly confessing his helplessness in being dragged by the imperialist Powers towards war, the *Dawn* quoted the *London Daily Express* as exclaiming rapturously:

"What a splendid market Britain enjoys in Pakistan. How eager then the British should be to encourage and sustain in Pakistan a vigorous member of the Commonwealth." (Sept. 12, 1950.)

It is time the people of Pakistan awoke to the dangerous implications of Liaqat Ali and Zafarullah's bankrupt policy of depending on the imperialists to win Kashmir. Under cover of helping the Pakistan rulers to acquire Kashmir, the Anglo-Americans are planning to swallow up the wealth and territories of Pakistan itself, and are forcing its leaders to offer up the youth of Pakistan as cannon-fodder in their criminal war-plans against Asia.

And even with all those faithful services, even if Liaqat Ali and Zafarullah sell off their country completely, the Anglo-Americans are not likely to make a gift of Kashmir in return. In its final analysis, the policy of Liaqat Ali and Zafarullah is not one of depending on the imperialists to gain Kashmir for Pakistan. It is really a policy of helping the imperialists to grab Kashmir for themselves.

And what do the people of Pakistan gain from this policy? Only the loss of their own sovereignty, a new enslavement, a further impoverishment, and a drive to inexorable disaster; only the lasting bitterness of their Kashmiri brethren who are being handed over, gagged and bound, by Pakistan's rulers to the tender mercies of the imperialists.

If the people of Pakistan are at all anxious to win the friendship of the Kashmiri people, they must fight resolutely against their leadership's attempts to barter away the freedom of Kashmir. They must force their Government to seek a really just, peaceful and democratic solution of the Kashmir problem *minus* the intervention of imperialism—a solution which guarantees the freedom and integrity of the people's movement in Kashmir.

A democratic plebiscite under the supervision of a Big-Five Commission, including the USSR and People's China, can alone provide the basis for such a solution.

That is the only way in which the people of Pakistan can really live up to their professions of helping their Kashmiri brethren to secure their freedom. That is the only way in which they can save Pakistan itself from becoming a helpless tool in the hands of imperialism. And more, that is the only way in which they can save Pakistan from itself being swallowed up by the Anglo-Americans.

Kashmir's national movement calls upon the people of both India and Pakistan to open their eyes to the dangers and disasters inherent in a continuation of the Kashmir dispute. Imperialism has used the Kashmir dispute as its most important weapon to beat down both the Governments, and to force both to line up quietly behind its criminal policies and war-plans. A just and peaceful

solution of the Kashmir problem is, therefore, not only the essential prerequisite to peaceful and friendly relations between India and Pakistan. It is also the essential prerequisite in any struggle to extricate the Indian and Pakistan Governments from the reactionary Anglo-American bloc and its plans for war.

On its own part, Kashmir is fully aware that the Anglo-Americans have been helped in their sinister intrigues not only by the reactionary and compromising policies of both the Indian and Pakistan Governments, but equally by the failure of Kashmir's leaders to solve the terrible economic and political crisis facing their own people: by the failure of Kashmir's leaders to keep their people and the national movement united as a solid, fighting, anti-imperialist force. All honest anti-imperialists and democrats in Kashmir realise that, given the correct economic, political and inner-organisational policies, a united national movement could have made Kashmir into another North Korea, where, if the Anglo-Americans had dared to intervene with all their colossal might, they would, like MacArthur in Korea, have met their Waterloo. In Kashmir, however, instead of any increase in the people's strength in the last three years, the people's movement has received a serious setback.

Realising, as the progressives of Kashmir do, the acute and appalling dangers which face the people today; realising that the people's movement — the only force which can challenge and hurl back the imperialist threat—has been already seriously weakened and confused; realising also that neither the people of India nor of Pakistan can fight successfully against the imperialist intervention until Kashmir itself rebuilds its democratic forces and begins to move again as it did in the glorious days of 1946 and 1947, the anti-imperialist and democratic elements in Kashmir must pledge themselves to fight resolutely against all obstacles which prevent the rebuilding of this once-powerful people's movement.

